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 I could not have started, let alone finished, this dissertation without the advice, 
cajoling, and support of many people to whom I want to give particular thanks.   
 Gautam Ahuja has been a constant guide from even before the start of the PhD 
program.  His willingness to let me explore through a wide variety of classes and ideas, 
and his kind waiting when I did explore too far, demonstrates his patience and 
compassion.  Even before the dissertation process, Gautam was always willing to talk 
through ideas—an impressive feat given his vast commitments throughout the university.  
When I wanted to do a self-guided degree program, Gautam wholeheartedly embraced 
the idea, and has been a champion for me throughout my time at U of M.  His logical 
thought process and vast knowledge of literature were critical in shaping my ideas, and 
his high standards have expanded my abilities both theoretically and econometrically.  
Gautam also deserves credit for pushing me off a dead end into a vast literature that made 
me excited to work on the dissertation.  As a chair he balanced the needs of good 
scholarship with the understanding that all research is a work in progress—and his advice 
and assistance have been invaluable. 
 My connection with Mark Mizruchi began in his economic sociology seminar and 
then continued as he guided my progress through the sociology department.  Mark 
selflessly met with me every week throughout the dissertation process, reading countless 
drafts and summaries and offering assistance in everything from theoretical development 
to statistical issues, to how to stop whining and just get on with it.  He celebrated my 
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achievements and helped me recover from stumbles.  Mark is a graduate student’s ideal 
reviewer:  he offers frank assessments of work, so if it is good, you know he truly 
believes so, and if it is not up to par, he gives concrete suggestions on how to get it there.  
Mark’s incredible enthusiasm for my topic and his genuine excitement at my progress 
and exploration made him invaluable throughout the entire the dissertation process.  His 
willingness to answer late night emails and frantic cell phone calls truly went beyond the 
call of duty.  I couldn’t have asked for a better co-chair. 
 Jason Owen-Smith captured my attention through his willingness to research 
potato lamps as an extended example in his Sociology of Science class.  I could always 
count on Jason for ideas and sources that pushed me to make my work more interesting 
and relevant.  Jason would take what I was saying and help mold it into something 
beyond what I could say on my own.  He deserves credit for pushing me to explore the 
idea of linguistic networks and what it might mean to connect firms via their schemes and 
not their actions or social ties.  His self-called “chicken scratch” on my drafts as well as 
his careful and kind discussion of methods pushed my dissertation to be stronger and 
more exciting. 
 Jim Westphal graciously agreed to join my committee despite having little 
experience with me as a student.  I wanted someone with incredibly sharp insight who 
would cut through my words and push to uncover the ideas (or lack thereof) beneath.  Jim 
filled this role with kindness and patience.  From a theoretical standpoint, Jim pushed me 
to think beyond the functional explanation into the broader social issues of firms—but 
only if the social explanation was really there.  His quiet intensity was a motivation in 
itself.   
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 Although Sendil Ethiraj was not officially on my committee, I feel he was an 
unofficial committee member.  Sendil deserves credit for reminding me of a pivotal piece 
on categorization by Viviana Zelizer.  Without rereading that, I would still be wondering 
how to make bankruptcy interesting to anyone else.  Sendil also offered helpful advice on 
everything from econometrics to framing.  He’s the best economist/strategist a 
sociologist/strategist could hope to know. 
 Other faculty members also frequently offered assistance.  In the strategy 
department, Hart Posen guided me through simultaneous equations and various methods 
panics.  He also tirelessly attended job talks.  Michael Jensen read a draft of my paper 
based on this dissertation; his valuable comments were critical in framing my paper to the 
audience who writes on categorization.  Brian Wu and Minyuan Zhao also offered 
support and feedback that improved my ideas, as did Jerry Davis, whose humor 
combined with tough questions help me answer, “Isn’t it really all just commensuration?”  
 On the sociology side, Fred Wherry gave fantastic advice on framing my 
contribution as well as critical feedback on the first theory chapter.  He was always able 
to suggest some area of research that really tied into what I was doing.  Greta Krippner 
reminded me of work by Harrison White at a critical time; as a result, the second part of 
the dissertation is much stronger.  She also attended multiple talks and read drafts of my 
chapters.  Yu Xie, Barbara Anderson, Renee Anspach, David Harding, and Kiyo Tsutsui 
also offered helpful feedback at critical times.  Howard Kimeldorf offered inspiration and 
a way of thinking about “puzzles” that will stay with me for every paper I write. 
 Outside of the University of Michigan, I am deeply indebted to Gordon Walker, 
chair of the strategy department at Southern Methodist University.  Gordon wrote the 
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recommendation that got me into U of M; somehow he thought that someone who trained 
as a costume designer might somehow do okay writing about strategy.  His avuncular 
advice in the past twelve months was beyond the call of duty.  His knowledge of wide 
ranging research gave me examples that deepened the way I thought about classification 
and communication.  His insight during several conversations improved the theory in 
both chapters.  He also reminds me to read in all areas, and to keep my hands in the data. 
 I also benefited from many interviews and insight from a variety of sources 
including current and former equity analysts, legal counsel, and investment bankers, most 
of whom wanted to remain anonymous.  Doug Bowers provided me with access; Haynes 
Morris provided me with the investor perspective as well.  Data providers also gave me 
insight into the world of equity research; even as they refused data they had promised I 
learned more about how this world worked.   
 In addition, I greatly benefited from the computing assistance of Paul Michaud, 
whose tireless efforts to get things right resulted in an eleventh hour revelation.  Without 
him I’d have no data.  In addition, Scott Willey provided programming expertise in the 
most ideal way thus allowing me to test interesting ideas about similarity. 
 Students at the University of Michigan have also been incredibly helpful.  
Aradhana Roy provided ideas, read drafts, gave reassurance and showed amazing 
integrity in situations where no one would have blamed her for remaining silent.  Her 
choices gave me opportunities I otherwise would not have had.  Eric Neuman, invaluable 
officemate, listened to woes and offered advice.  He read early drafts of my first theory 
chapter, and helped me think about how to fit my ideas in with the broader literature.  I 
hope we can work together in the future.  Nathan Wilson, running partner and statistician 
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extraordinaire, provided both comic relief and serious advice on all kinds of econometric 
issues.  His patience as I asked what I am sure were embarrassingly elementary questions 
about statistics and the economics perspective has been truly appreciated.  That he did so 
while also teaching, redoing vast quantities of data, and searching for a dissertation topic 
in the vast black hole known as the third year is even more exceptional.  Alex Gerber 
provided an incredibly nuanced cultural sociological perspective.  Her presence as I tried 
out ideas in many seminars was calming.  Discussions that ensued really advanced my 
thinking.  And I benefited greatly from her editing advice and fast turnaround on early 
drafts.  I also was glad to find someone who liked sugar just as much as I did. 
 So many students attended a variety of seminars and talks based on the 
dissertation—a quick run down includes Vivek, David, David, Bo Kyung, Pranav, Sun 
Hyun, John, Maria, Melissa, and Helena as well as many other students in the economic 
sociology seminar series and sociology graduate student workshops.  Former students 
were also incredibly helpful.  Francisco Polidoro dropped everything to read an early 
draft of my paper; his feedback was critical.  PK Toh offered practical advice and 
genuine excitement about my topic as well as mundane bureaucratic issues.  Anne 
Parmigiani provided useful advice about how to communicate my ideas to the general 
world. 
 Finally, my family deserves great thanks.  Both parents were desperate to have me 
embrace capitalism—I think I’ve gotten awfully close, though I’m sure this was not 
exactly the way they intended.  Their constant support really made the difference.  My 
sister and Kirk provided artistic and intellectual assistance in unexpected ways—who 
knew that Suzy the philosopher would have created RSS feeds about equity and debt 
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research, or that Kirk would do an entire set of Cy Twombly photographs while in the 
middle of a larger and much more important project?   
 And most importantly, my husband Mark put up with everything from the very 
beginning, often while helpless in a different city and while juggling his own intense 
schedule.  I haven’t forgotten the fantastic RA work you did, although I’m finally going 
to admit I didn’t use all of it.  You help me do what is right, and not what is easy.  I’m 
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In the past few years, organizational researchers have found a renewed interest in 
categorization and its consequences.  Most research focuses on the consequences of 
categorization for the categorized objects, arguing that a clear identity is important for 
users to understand (and thus value) an object.  In my dissertation, I shift the perspective 
from the users and the categorized objects to focus on the creator of the classification 
scheme.   I question the commonly held assumption that categories are created to reduce 
ambiguity and structure the world for users.  In the first part of my dissertation, I suggest 
conditions under which a categorizer might create an ambiguous classification scheme 
rather than an unambiguous one.  I argue that the ambiguity of the classification scheme 
depends on the categorizer’s relationship with the objects it rates, its relationship with 
many different types of users, and its status relative to other categorizers within the 
industry.  By doing so, I move the focus away from the results of categorization to the 
antecedent of it.  Users frequently question whether an object has been correctly placed in 
a classification scheme, but they must also question whether the scheme itself has been 
created strategically by the categorizer.  In the second part of my dissertation, I examine 
the performance of the categorizer as a result of its classification scheme.  While strategic 
behavior may help an organization achieve its objectives, in the long run, there may be 
negative consequences for a categorizer when the meaning of a classification scheme 
cannot be understood.  I argue that overly ambiguous classification schemes lead to 
decreases in customer accounts.  In addition, I measure the linguistic network position of 
individual schemes to illuminate how the usage of different schemes within an 
organizational field affects all firms in the industry.  I use equity rating systems (for 
example, “buy, sell, hold”) in the United States during the years 1993-1999 as a setting in 






1.1  Overview 
 Research on categorization has exploded over the past decade, with scholars 
examining areas ranging from borders of countries (Sahlins, 1991), to technological 
breakthroughs and stock market categorization (Benner, 2007), to whether or not poor 
Americans are “deserving” or “undeserving” of welfare (Steensland, 2006).  
Categorization invites study because categories underlie almost all of human thought.     
The act of categorizing places like things with like so as to better understand the world 
around us.  Individuals develop categories to understand everything from time (before 
and after) to what to eat (fruits, vegetables, dairy, meat).  Groups develop categorizations 
of insiders and outsiders.  No matter what is being analyzed, at its essence, categorization 
is about creating meaning (Durkheim & Mauss, 1972 (1963); Levi-Strauss, 1983).   
Meaning occurs not only through an assessment of the attributes of a set of objects within 
a single category, but also through an understanding of the interplay of all possible 
categories (Bowker & Star, 2000; Goodman, 1992).  We learn as much about an object 
by knowing what it is not as we do by knowing what it is.   
 Categorization is particularly important to organizations.  Categories help them 
understand the market in which they compete as well as the actions available to them.  
Organizations develop informal categories to define the appropriate band of competitors 
and to differentiate themselves from others (Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989).  
These categories reinforce an organization’s identity and fend off imitation 
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(Swaminathan, 1998).  In addition to informal categories created by organizations, 
organizations are also affected by formal classification schemes, in which they or their 
products are classified by an outside entity (Douglas, 1986).  Unlike other categorizations, 
classification schemes, which include industry directories, rating systems, and product 
guides, are created with the explicit knowledge that they will be employed by a set of 
users different from the entity that created them.   For example, SIC codes identify 
industry membership, which can have a wide impact on a firm’s activities.  Mergers 
between competitors or firms seen as operating within the same industry require special 
approval from the government, and may require divestitures of certain areas of a firm’s 
activities.  Because of such potential influence, classification schemes play a vital role in 
organizational life. 
 My dissertation focuses on these classification schemes.  Specifically, I look at 
the equity rating systems (“Buy, Hold, Sell” for example) used by United States broker-
dealers.  Since they are created by outsiders, classification schemes help to order markets 
by creating structures through which market actors and their products can be observed 
and understood by consumers (Hsu, 2006b; Hsu & Podolny, 2005; Rao, Monin, & 
Durand, 2005; Zuckerman, 1999).  In this sense, they are interpretive devices for users’ 
decision making, because users see them as a helpful way in which to view a particular 
landscape of objects.  Within a classification scheme, objects that are difficult to classify 
or that blur boundaries are devalued because users cannot understand them.  As a result, 
the message to objects is plain:  develop a clear identity in order to receive the maximum 
benefits of classification.  For users, too, the norms of classification suggest that schemes 
are created to improve clarity and understanding. 
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 While the perspective of the classified objects and the users has been strongly 
elaborated in the literature on classification schemes, the role of the categorizer has been 
generally ignored.  The categorizer creates and maintains the classification scheme and 
does the classifying.  Furthermore, in markets, there is often competition among 
categorizers who purvey multiple schemes, each offering alternative interpretations of a 
given market.  In my dissertation, I adopt the perspective of the categorizer in exploring 
the creation and performance of the classification scheme.  At its essence, categorization 
is about creating meaning, which occurs through both the relationship of a given object to 
others within its category (the focus of prior literature) and also through the interplay of 
all possible categories within a given scheme (the focus of my dissertation). Thus far, the 
composition of the classification scheme itself has been largely taken for granted.  The 
assumption is that the collection of categories which constitutes the scheme is always 
unambiguous—yet little research has examined this.  In fact, ambiguous classification 
schemes can and do exist.  Without understanding why these schemes are created and 
how they perform, we understand only part of the effects of categorization.   
 My dissertation addresses this gap by asking two questions:  (1) why are 
ambiguous classifications schemes created? and (2) does the composition of the 
classification schemes impact categorizer performance?  The first question addresses the 
critical issue of needing to relate individual categories to others within a given scheme.  
The second addresses the ability of classification schemes, however they are created, to 
generate meaning in a complex world.  In addition, I extend the scope of prior research 
by considering multiple classification schemes of different categorizers. This allows me 
to address the important issue of competition, and how competition among categorizers 
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affects the creation and maintenance of classification schemes, and thus the meaning of a 
particular industry.   Categorizers compete with each other for users of the classification 
scheme and for objects to categorize.   
 In Part I of my dissertation, I examine the composition of the classification 
scheme itself.  My starting point is prior research that has focused on the role of 
ambiguity in categorized objects.  In general, this research points to an ambiguity 
discount: objects which are difficult to classify have poorer performance because they are 
less understood.  This has been shown in the stock market, where companies that have 
confusing identities trade for lower than comparable firms which can be more easily 
described (Zuckerman 1999, Zuckerman 2004); in early credit ratings, where firms with 
ambiguous identities received lower credit ratings than both hybrid and single business 
firms (Ruef and Patterson 2007); in French gastronomy, where restaurants using both 
nouvelle and classic techniques receive fewer stars than specialists (Rao et al., 2005), and 
in the film industry, where actors who do not have a recognizable type work less often 
than those who do in the early stages of their career (Zuckerman 2004).  
 Focusing on the ambiguity of categorized objects seems to assume that, were an 
object only unambiguous, it could be placed in its appropriate category and it would be 
understood.  For this to happen, however, the classification scheme must also be 
unambiguous.  Understanding cannot occur if the classification scheme itself is not clear.  
I challenge this assumption of clarity by detailing why a categorizer might create an 
ambiguous classification scheme rather than an unambiguous one.  I define an ambiguous 
classification scheme as one where a single object could be correctly placed in multiple 
categories (Ruef 2007, Abbott 1997).  I suggest that the ambiguity of the classification 
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scheme depends on the categorizer’s relationship with the objects it rates, its relationship 
with many different types of users, and its status within the industry.  By doing so, I 
move the focus away from the results of categorization to the antecedent of it.  Users 
must ask not only if a scheme is used correctly, but also if it has been created in such a 
way that understanding is possible.  Furthermore, I examine the availability of ambiguity 
as a strategy.  Theoretically, any organization can choose to be ambiguous, but in practice, 
ambiguity may be available only to certain kinds of organizations. 
 In Part II, I consider the impact of the scheme on the categorizer’s performance.  
While Part I suggests that categorizers may create ambiguous classification schemes 
when it is beneficial to the categorizer, Part II examines whether there are consequences 
for such choices.  Ambiguity is a double edged sword:  while organizations benefit from 
creating ambiguity ((Leifer, 1991; March, 1994; Padgett & Ansell, 1993; White, 1992), 
audiences discount it.  I suggest that the relationship of ambiguity and performance 
follows an inverted U:  too little ambiguity hamstrings the organization, but too much 
dissuades audience members.  However, the performance of the scheme is also impacted 
by the similarity of the scheme to other schemes.   To examine this, I build a linguistic 
network to examine how the labels given to individual categories within a single 
classification scheme connect across all possible classification schemes.  I contrast the 
similarity of the scheme with categorizers who have the exact same scheme as other 
categorizers.  While using a prevalent scheme gives a categorizer legitimacy, it shifts the 
locus of competition to the use of the scheme—to the categorizer’s ability to share 
information and categorize objects.     
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 By focusing on the performance of the categorizer, I shed light on an 
undertheorized area.  Much is known about the performance of individual objects as the 
result of their categorization, but little is known about whether or not the classification 
scheme impacts the performance of the categorizer that creates it.  Each classification 
scheme represents a way of seeing a particular world of objects—a culturally influenced 
meaning system beyond simply conveying information.   I argue that this way of seeing 
has material impact for categorizers, in terms of customer response.  At a higher level, 
my dissertation points to larger cultural influences on firm performance:  strategy matters, 
but that strategy influenced by how knowledge is conveyed within the bounds of the 
classification scheme.   
 
1.2  Literature 
 My approach is rooted in the literature of categorization.  While I focus primarily 
on sociological approaches of categorization as reflecting social processes, I also use 
literature from linguistics and cognitive psychology to address issues of language and 
how meaning is understood from words and from categorized objects.  I augment this 
with literature from strategy dealing with the importance of performance, the effects of 
competition and choices of differentiation within a market setting.  For both theory 
sections, I use literature on ambiguity in sociology, economics, and linguistics to 
elaborate the creation and the reception of classification schemes.   
 
1.3  Setting 
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 I use equity rating systems of United States broker-dealers between the years of 
1993-1999 as a setting to test my hypotheses.  Broker-dealers create rating systems for 
categorizing the equities of publicly traded firms.  These classification systems are based 
on quality.  While most classification schemes are based on three possible types of 
ratings, positive, neutral, and negative (often typified as ‘buy, hold, sell’), in fact a great 
deal of variation in the makeup of the scheme and the category labels exist.  As a result, 
this allows me to test not only how an individual scheme is created, but also how 
alternative schemes might be created.  Prior research on classification schemes has often 
been limited to an examination of a single scheme.  My sample contains over four 
hundred firms, which provides significant variation. 
 I focus on the years from 1993 to 2000 because in 2000, the industry began to 
face significant changes.  The Glass-Steagall Act was repealed in late 1999, allowing 
commercial banks to enter into investment banking for the first time since before the 
depression.  In addition, a series of scandals rocked the industry in 2001, starting with the 
fall of Enron and later MCI Worldcom, but also as the result of the exposure of 
incriminating emails from a number of highly rated analysts.  These emails suggested that 
analysts were recommending stocks in public while privately disparaging them.  As a 
result of these events and the ensuing Global Equities Settlement, the rules guiding equity 
analysis changed greatly.  1992 through 1994 begins a shift in the landscape of broker-
dealers, as some began to focus on investment banking as a revenue source rather than 
simply appealing to potential investors.  This shift in audience may be captured in the 
performance of the classification scheme. 
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 Focusing on rating systems during this time period allows me to examine 
classification schemes as they might operate “in the wild,” without coercive pressures to 
control the kind of classification scheme that any firm created.   
 
1.4  Structure of the Dissertation 
 The structure of my dissertation is narrative in form.  I begin with a review of 
relevant literature.  I then suggest a series of hypotheses predicting when organizations 
will create ambiguous classification schemes.  I follow this with hypotheses that examine 
the effects of classification choices on performance.  I explain the methods and measures 





 This chapter begins the theoretical development for the hypotheses discussed in 
chapters 3 and 4.  I specifically focus on two literatures:  the literature on categorization 
and the literature on ambiguity within organizations and across individuals.  The 
literature on categorization as it has been used in psychology, sociology, and 
organizations is examined first.  Then, I move to a subset of the literature on 
categorization, specifically categorizers as critics, or those whose classification schemes 
are used to determine object quality.  Finally, I synthesize these research streams. 
 
2.1 Overview of Categorization 
 Categories are pervasive.  National borders, grades in school, tax brackets—all 
are divisions of the world.  Categories structure the world around us by answering the 
question, “What is this?”  Categorization (also known as classification) is, at its heart, the 
process of understanding a series of objects by grouping some of them together and 
separating them from others (Zerubavel, 1991, 1996).  A category or classification is a “a 
spatial, temporal, or spatio temporal segmentation of the world” (Bowker et al., 2000).  
 At least three roles participate in categorization.  The first role is that of the 
category creator.  This entity develops the taxonomy of categories.  For the purposes of 
this dissertation, this role shall be called the categorizer.  The second role is that of the 
objects that are categorized.  Anything is a candidate for categorization.  Thus, 
categorized objects can include humans, organizations, or inanimate objects such as 
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equities, animals, or plants as well as ideas and time.  They occupy, often in groups, 
individual categories within a classification scheme.  For the purposes of this dissertation, 
I shall call these objects.  The third role is the entity that uses the classification scheme.  
Individuals, groups and organizations extract information from looking at what objects 
are placed in a classification scheme.  I shall call these users.  For example, when looking 
at automobile classification, Car & Driver Magazine would be a categorizer, an 
individual wanting to buy a car would be a user, and BMW would be an object.1   
 These roles may be played by distinct actors, or a single actor or group of actors 
may play multiple roles.  For example, cliques in elementary school are created by the 
students themselves.  A particular group of students (usually members of an in-group) 
then categorize other students.  The “popular” students decide who is popular and who is 
not.  In this case, the “popular” students are categorizers, users, and objects.  Other 
students are also objects because they are classified as unpopular.  They may also be 
users of the scheme to the extent that they know who is “popular” and change their action 
accordingly.  In business, the United States government creates an industry classification 
scheme that groups businesses according to what industry they are in.  This classification 
scheme is used by individuals.  In this example, the government is the categorizer, 
businesses are objects, and individuals (such as PhD students) are users. 
 The simplest categorical division is a binary, in-group/out-group definition, but 
there may be many separate categories created to define a given set of objects or 
experiences.  Groups of categories that order certain kinds of objects are considered 
                                                 
1 My interest is in the individuals and organizations that have agency in the process of categorization.  It is 
possible for an object to create many objects that can be classified.  For example, BMW has several models of 
cars that could be classified in Car and Driver magazine.  The cars have no agency, and cannot complain, for 
example, if they are miscategorized.  Only BMW or its representatives can do that.  It is also possible that the 
object itself may be categorized, for example, the company BMW belongs in the category 5012 in SIC codes.  
In this case, BMW acts on its own behalf if it wishes to respond to the SIC codes.   
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schema.  When that schema is created and maintained by an official or institutionalized 
actor, it is called a classification scheme (Lounsbury & Rao, 2004).  Classification 
schemes differ from other kinds of categories in two ways.  First, the roles of user, object, 
and categorizer are usually distinct.  Second, the set of possible categories is defined and 
known.  In a formal classification scheme, categorizers make a choice from a set of 
objects, and cannot add or subtract categories at will.  This is in sharp contrast to informal 
categories, such as strategic groups, niche theories in ecological research, and 
psychological studies of human categorization.  In informal classification, categories are 
socially constructed, and can appear and disappear at will.  For example, humans 
constantly use an array of different categories, blending and changing them with ease 
(Hsu, 2006b; Hsu et al., 2005).  New industries arise where none were before, solidified 
through producers, media mentions, and customer awareness (Kennedy, 2005).  In the 
literature on strategic groups, such groups exist only when some quality of the group 
contributes to performance, and thus groups may be constructed or destructed based on a 
variety of dimensions (Dranove, Peteraf, & Shanley, 1998).  In a formal classification 
scheme, the creation or removal of a category is not so easily done, and is subject to both 
technical and strategic considerations (Lounsbury et al., 2004).  Since multiple categories 
are visible in a formal classification scheme, they are especially useful areas of inquiry 
for understanding how categories come about.  In addition, they provide opportunities for 
understanding the structure of the scheme itself. 
 Classification schemes can be vertical or horizontal or a combination of both.  
Vertical classifications schemes imply a hierarchy of order, where one or more categories 
are above other categories (Schwartz, 1981).  Examples of vertical classification schemes 
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include grades in school, quality ratings, and caste systems.  Horizontal classification 
schemes are attributional based categories, where one category is not necessarily better or 
more advanced than another.  Horizontal classification schemes include product 
directories, restaurant guides, and SIC codes.  However, horizontal categories may have 
some elements of vertical categories, given that value or status is often placed upon 
certain categories.  For example, although job classifications are generally considered 
horizontal categories, some job categories are considered more prestigious than others. 
 The process of categorizing involves at least two parts:  the creation of the 
classification scheme and the use of it.   Literature focusing on the creation of 
classification schemes examines the underlying structure of the categories created.  It 
seeks to understand why and how categories are created.  The second division, the use of 
the scheme, studies how categories are enacted.  This branch seeks to understand how 
categories are used and takes for granted the underlying set of categories.   It also 
examines the consequences of such use.  The vast majority of work centers on the use of 
categories, with special emphasis on the consequences for categorization, particularly in 
terms of those being classified.   
 Because the roles of users, objects and categorizers are often played by single 
actors, most theoretical work discusses both usage and creation together.  For example, in 
Durkheim’s work on signs, he considers the creation and deployment of tribal totems to 
be a reflection of the social divisions between different tribes (Durkheim, 1995; 
Durkheim et al., 1972 (1963)).  Yet, the processes of creation and use are conceptually 
distinct even though the roles may be blended.  First, the same system can be used for 
many purposes.  For example, racial classification systems separate humans into 
13 
categories based on historical origin.  Although they all look similar, systems of racial 
classification can be used in vastly different ways.  The same racial classification system 
that allows affirmative action also allows apartheid regimes.   In addition, category 
creation is defining a vision for seeing a landscape of objects.  Category use examines 
which options are chosen and what is placed in each category.  Because humans and their 
institutions are categorizers, there is fallibility in the implementation of the classification 
schemes.  Furthermore, there is meaning in the creation of the system.  Separating and 
examining each part of the process allows researchers to understand these meanings.   
 
2.2 Use of Categories 
 Research dealing with the usage of a classification scheme focuses first on which 
objects are placed in which individual category as well as the consequences of such 
placement.  Once a set of categories have been created, objects are placed within them 
through a process of ‘lumping and splitting’ (Lounsbury et al., 2004; Zerubavel, 1996).  
Lumping involves grouping things together based on some attributes as defined by the 
category into which they are placed.  Splitting involves the separation of objects in one 
category from objects in another.  The degree to which these processes work hinges on 
the distinctness of the individual categories.  Where there are sharp categorical 
boundaries, lumping and splitting is a fairly routine and consistent process.  However, 
when categorical boundaries are less clear, classification becomes difficult (Lamont & 
Fournier, 1992; Lamont & Molnar, 2002; Rao et al., 2005). 
 Two theories offer explanations for the process of lumping objects together.  
Aristotelian categorization posits that an object is placed in a category based on a set of 
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defined attributes which exist, much like a list of requirements (Bowker et al., 2000).  
The object either possesses these attributes or does not.  In this binary world, possession 
of attributes means automatic inclusion in the category, while lack of possession means 
automatic exclusion from the category.  For example, in the category “Sports that use 
spherical objects,” croquet, baseball, and shot put belong, but cycling, football, and 
gymnastics are excluded.    Prototypical categorization, on the other hand, argues that 
categorization occurs without a list of required attributes.  Instead, objects are placed into 
a category based on their similarity to an idealized type.  Thus, seating devices with four, 
three, and two legs may all fit into the category “chair.”  Aristotelian categorization tends 
to create categorical absolutes, while prototypical categorization has a greater potential 
for confusion.  This occurs because associations across categorizers may not always be 
consistent, and as more things are associated with the category, the identity of the 
category may be come unclear.  Consider the pictures of objects in Figure 2.1. 
All are possible values for the category “chair” based on association of different elements, 
but not all of them are necessarily chairs.  The drawing is not a tangible object to sit upon, 
nor is the numbered chair sculpture.   
 The question of whether Aristotelian or prototypical categorization more closely 
resembles the way humans actually categorize has been the subject of lively debate, 
particularly in psychological research.  In general, researchers believe that humans 
categorize largely through prototypical association, examining an object and comparing it 
to already classified objects.  This makes sense, given that cognitive categories created by 
humans are flexible divisions created and used by a single individual.  Consistency in 
human categorization may be helpful for a given person’s cognition, but not absolutely 
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necessary.  In the case of firms, the literature on strategic groups suggests that managers 
of firms engage in constant pairwise comparisons of their firm to others using some 
strategic dimension, discarding dissimilar firms while remembering similar ones.  These 
groupings may then be communicated with other managers within the firm to generate a 
firm level cognition of who is in or out of the strategic group (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997).  
Conversely, in formal classification schemes, Aristotelian, rule based classification often 
occurs, since many different people or groups within a single categorizer are likely to use 
the scheme.  Rules-based classification, in theory, provides better likelihood that objects 
will be consistently placed in the appropriate category. 
 
2.2.1  Consequences of Categorization 
 Being placed in a category has immediate consequences not only for categorized 
objects, but also for users.  In general, the consequences of categorization can be divided 
into three groups:  cognitive, social, and technical.  Cognitive consequences involve those 
consequences that affect how users understand the objects in a particular category.  Social 
consequences involve how objects are influenced by being placed in a particular category.  
Technical consequences focus on how users allocate resources based on categorization. 
Cognitive Consequences 
 Awareness.  Being placed in a classification scheme creates awareness of the 
objects that are categorized.  Since categories structure the world around us, being placed 
within a category determines the world “worth knowing.”  Objects that are not 
categorized are often treated as if they do not exist (Bowker et al., 2000; Zerubavel, 
1991).  
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 Order.  Categorization creates order (Douglas & Hull, 1992; Estes, 1994; Zhao, 
2005).  Objects within a particular category are placed there because they are to be seen 
as similar to each other.  As a result, categorization creates order, by defining what is like 
what.  This order often becomes the standard for interpreting how objects relate to each 
other.  As a result, alternative classifications or ways of seeing may not be seen once a 
particular categorization system is in use. 
Social Consequences 
 Behavioral Expectations.  When something is categorized it creates a set of 
expectations about future actions.  This occurs because of the association of attributes 
with a particular category.  Thus, mass media films perform worse in art house movie 
theatres because art house theatres create an expectation of the kind of work being shown 
(Zuckerman, Tai-Young, Kalinda, & James von, 2003b).  Likewise, “craft beers” need to 
be created in small batches and not sourced from mass producers in order to succeed 
because the conception of a craft beer is an antithesis to scale production (Carroll & 
Swaminathan, 2000; Swaminathan, 1998).   
 Behavioral expectations may occur because of the labeling that accompanies the 
individual categories (Becker, 1997 (1963)).  For example, an innovation categorized as 
architectural will be tremendously concerning to incumbent producers, even though it 
seems to be continuing current practices—because these types of innovations destroy the 
product architecture used by incumbent producers lack expertise (Henderson and Clark 
1990).  Labeling theory deals with this notion particularly, arguing that simply by 
classifying an object in a particular way, humans can influence the behavior and 
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perceptions of that object.  For example, Becker argues that simply labeling an individual 
as a criminal increases the propensity for criminal acts (Becker, 1997 (1963)). 
 Identity.  For categorized objects, the act of being placed in a category confers an 
identity because it establishes a social or symbolic boundary around those in a particular 
category (Bowker et al., 2000; Douglas, 1986; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Zerubavel, 1996).  
Whether socially created or drawn from some perceived reality, attributes are the basis of 
categorization.  Irrespective of what is put into it, the category itself has an identity based 
on these attributes as they are a set of expectations of what the category is.  To the extent 
that objects within a particular category are social objects, whether individuals or 
organizations, they reinforce the identity conferred by the category attributes by created 
shared expectations and codes for fellow category members.  Thus, Scottish knitwear 
producers know that they create “top quality cashmere pullover and cardigan sweaters” 
and furthermore see themselves as unique in doing so (Porac et al., 1989).  Members of 
their group have certain requirements, such as geographic location in a certain part of 
Scotland, fully fashioned sweater technology, and high quality yarns knit in a classic 
style.  Within members of the group, there is a shared sense of understanding and a 
tendency to minimize threats to the group.  In addition, the act of being grouped creates a 
shared sense of identity among all of those who have that identity, whether or not they 
know each other (Sahlins, 1991).  A study of British school children, for example, found 
that they tried to create favorable disparities in distribution of rewards toward members 
of their own group—even when they did not know specifically who was in their in-group 
(Tajfel et al., 1986).   
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 Legitimacy  Closely connected to identity is the notion of legitimacy.  As 
mentioned before, the attributes that define categories bring with them a set of 
expectations about how other objects in the category will behave.  Category membership 
requires adherence to this set of expectations.  Objects that conform to these expectations 
are considered legitimate by external audiences (Suchman, 1995; Zhao, 2005; Zuckerman, 
1999). Legitimacy is desirable for individuals and organizations because it helps them 
accrue resources which are necessary for survival (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Powell & 
Maggio, 1991; Suchman, 1995).  In addition, the meaning of an individual or 
organization is enhanced when it is perceived as legitimate.  Legitimate forms are seen as 
“more meaningful, more trustworthy, and more predictable”(Suchman, 1995).  
Illegitimate behavior, that which is inconsistent with prevailing norms for group 
membership, can lead to expulsion from the group.   
 Status  The overall categorization scheme creates a status order.  This occurs 
because of the social value that users place on objects in some categories, whether or not 
the classification scheme is horizontal or vertical.  This nonmonetary value is determined 
by privileging certain attributes or qualities above others.  Because of this comparative 
nature, the status created is inherently relational (Bourdieu, 1984).  Status can also be 
achieved, such as when categories are determined by technical characteristics or 
accomplishments (Podolny, 1993). 
Technical Consequences 
 Value Categorization can influence the financial value of the categorized object.  
The act of being categorized also determines some amount of value on a particular object, 
depending on which category it is placed in.  For example, stocks that are difficult to 
19 
categorize trade at a discount relative to those that are easier to categorize (Zuckerman, 
1999).  Stocks that are downgraded see their price fall (Lin & McNichols, 1998; Mikhail, 
Walther, & Willis, 1999; O'Brien, McNichols, & Lin, 2005; Stickel, 1992; Womack, 
1996).   
  Resources.  Categorization may influence resource procurement and allocation.  
For example, dividing people into categories of income determines who should pay what 
taxes.  Thus, fiscal policy in the Nixon era created divisions between “deserving” and 
“undeserving” poor (Steensland, 2006).  The “deserving” poor, were, as their name 
implied, worthy of receiving financial assistance.  The undeserving poor, on the other 
hand, were not. 
2.2.2  Strategic Use of Categories 
 Because of the important consequences of categorization, a large body of research 
has suggested that categories can be used strategically—that is, that the placement of 
objects within a category can occur to benefit certain objects.  For example, Porac et al 
examined firms creating referent groups of comparable firms when discussing CEO 
compensation, as required by law (Porac, Wade, & Pollock, 1999).  While the intended 
notion of the law was for firms to identify with similar firms in their industry, the 
researchers found that organizations that paid their CEO more than the industry average 
were likely to carefully select a reference group based not on similarity of firm but on 
compensation, so that their behavior seemed well in line with expected behavior.  As a 
result, the firm in question would seem to be acting appropriately within a categorical 
boundary.  Several studies have also documented occurrences of favorable classification.  
For example, Hayward and Boeker (and others) have documented that some stock market 
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analysts place stocks in a more favorable rating category when their firms also do 
underwriting business in those industries (Hayward & Boeker, 1998; Kessler, 2004; Lin 
et al., 1998; McNichols & O'Brien, 1997). 
 However, all of this research takes the underlying categories as a given.  That is, it 
asks, given that categories exist, how are they used?  Yet the way in which categories are 
created may in fact have an impact on how they are used.  In the next section, I explore 
research that discusses how and why categories are created. 
 
2.3  The Creation of Categories 
2.3.1  How Categories are Created 
 The act of category creation itself occurs in one of three ways:  invention, 
borrowing, and encounter (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001).  Each suggests a particular 
way in which categories are created—either as the product of a human mind responding 
to a need to make sense of the world, or as individuals responding to the categories of 
others.   Invention occurs because a new category is created in response to a new set of 
objects.  This supports a view of categories as individually created unique objects:  
humans have the capability to determine that some objects do not fit into the current 
order, and act independently to develop or expand their current schemes.  Encounter 
describes the process that occurs when pre-existing categorical notions are blended 
together to form a new category, such as the categories of truck and car converging to 
create the new category of minivan (Rosa, Porac, Runser-Spanjol, & Saxon, 1999).  
Borrowing is the process of noticing a category in use by another entity and appropriating 
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it for oneself.  This implies a distinctly social notion of categorization—and one in which 
categorizers compare their own schemas to those of other categorizers to see how they fit. 
 The debate of how and why categories are created has captivated philosophers 
from the early Greeks and the enlightenment, and has been joined by empirical 
researchers from psychology and sociology.  Present day studies have broadened to 
include animals in an effort to understand what occurs simply as a part of mental 
processing and what might be distinctly human:  pigeons can distinguish between 
categories with training, as can rats, monkeys, and horses (Aydin & Pearce, 1994; Hanggi, 
1999; III, Orduna, & Nowak, 2005; Makino & Jitsumori, 2007).  As computer 
programming has become more integrated with everyday activities, machines have begun 
to categorize as well.   
 Philosophers and early social theorists argued that categories are innately created 
within a single human being—that is, that categories are a process of invention.  Kant 
suggested that individuals even in the wild would create categories in order to facilitate 
thinking.  The first categories, he argued, were temporal and spatial distinctions (Bowker 
et al., 2000).  These categories (past,present; near, far) were the foundational basis for 
other distinctions by which individuals understood and perceived their world.  Categories 
arose and were created whenever new things were encountered as a sorting process. 
 Research and theory in developmental psychology suggest that children develop 
categories as a way of understanding (Piaget, 1955).  Studies with infants have noted that 
individuals do seem to innately categorize even before they can express themselves. 
Experiments show that 8 month old babies understand that similar objects should behave 
in similar ways (Needham, Cantlon, & Holley, 2006).  Keys and key rings are objects 
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that are familiar to babies; when these objects are separated unexpectedly, babies are 
surprised, showing that they associated the two together (Needham, 2001; Needham et al., 
2006).  As humans grow, their classification schemes become more sophisticated—
simple categories such as “dog” are replaced by more specific ones such as “collie” 
(Blewitt, 1983).   
 In addition, different individuals may categorize differently.  For example, trees 
are classified differently depending on whether one is a college student, horticulturist, or 
member of an indigenous tribe (Estes, 1994; Zhao, 2005).  These differences occur 
because individuals select different attributes upon which to base their classification.  
These differences are distinctly social differences.  That is, an individual horticulturist 
may create a difference classification scheme than a college student, but in general, 
horticulturists have different understanding of trees than the average college student.  
Similarly, the indigenous tribe may create a classification system not only because of 
different perceptions of what trees are, but because trees have a different meaning to 
them (Levi-Strauss, 1968, 1983). 
 A long tradition in sociology focuses on this notion that categorization is not just 
some innate human capacity but instead, the result of social interaction that molds and 
facilitates the creation of categories.  Durkheim proposed that categories are a part of 
daily life because categories exist in social life.  “The first logical categories were social 
categories; the first classes of things were classes of men, into which these things were 
integrated.  It was because men were grouped, and thought of themselves in the form of 
groups, that in their ideas they grouped other things…” (Durkheim et al., 1972 (1963)). 
Humans live in communities, and share categories among regions which may not be 
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necessarily reproduced throughout other regions.  Rather than simply noting the 
difference between different individuals, sociologists have focused on how this social 
interaction allows for the creation of categories in the first place. 
 The social notion of grouping is important simply because so many plausible 
methods of categorizing a set of objects are possible.  Wine is classified differently in 
different areas of the world, even though the ingredients for wine-making do not vary 
(Zhao, 2005).  Consumers and car producers develop different classification schemes for 
automobiles (Rosa et al., 1999).  “The dictionaries of the French textile industry show 
that classifications emanating from administrative institutions have a territorial base 
while those emanating from manufacturing institutions focus on production” (Lamont et 
al., 1992).  While money seems like a simple category of a single currency, in fact 
humans categorize money based on purpose in their home lives (Zelizer, 1989).  Thus 
rent money is separate from food money, and wives’ money is separate from their 
husbands.  These examples show that while classification schemes are ostensibly 
developed based on attributes of different objects to be classified, which attributes form 
the basis of that distinction is determined by social groups (Starr, 1992). 
 Furthermore, not only do different groups determine different attributes as the 
appropriate ones upon which to build a system, but also different groups may come 
together to create the system in the first place.  These groups create categories either for 
themselves or in conversation with all members of a field (Becker, 1982; Peteraf et al., 
1997).  In the first case, a group may create a cognitive representation of what it means to 
be in a particular category.  For example, Scottish knitwear producers see themselves as a 
distinct type of knitwear manufacturer (Porac et al., 1989).  This distinction was created 
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by the manufacturers themselves; customers and suppliers may not necessarily see this 
division.  In other instances, categories may appear as the result of conversation and 
consultation within a field.  For example, what constitutes high art is determined not 
solely by a single artist, but instead by the intersection of artists, gallery owners, museum 
curators, and patrons (Becker, 1982; Varnedoe, 1990).  These groups negotiate what 
becomes high art and what remains merely pop art or folk art.     
 In addition, third parties may help solidify or publicize classification schemes.  
Third parties may simply publicize categories that are already being considered by users 
or those being categorized (Kennedy, 2005).  This publicity serves to solidify categories 
as meaningful and appropriate.  For example, media publicity about nascent categories of 
automobiles creates an understanding of new categories of automobile(Rosa et al., 1999).  
Media also help solidify competitive groups and the players within an industry by linking 
together particular objects (Kennedy, 2005). 
 
2.3.2  Individual Categories vs. Groups of Categories 
 The prior discussion centered largely on the creation of individual categories.  Yet 
categories may also appear in groups—that is, as part of a classification scheme.  
Classification schemes differ slightly from cognitive categories used by individuals or 
groups to understand their world.  Classification schemes are created by fiat, either by 
institutions, individuals, or organizations.  Institutions with legitimate authority create 
sets of categories because they wield power over the objects they wish to categorize 
(Douglas, 1986).  Thus, governments can create systems of apartheid based on racial 
classifications (Bowker et al., 2000).  However, while schemes can be created that 
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disadvantage others, institutionally created classification schemes need not be negative or 
oppressive.  Part of the benefits of having legitimate authority is the ability to create 
systems that can be adopted and used by those connected to the institution.  Tax brackets, 
grades in schools and the like also help create societal order. 
 Formal classification schemes can also be created by organizations or individuals  
that wish to order a particular set of objects and then communicate that classification 
scheme to a set of users.  Organizations creating classification schemes act as market 
intermediaries when these schemes encompass objects that they do not produce or control.  
Thus, newspapers, investment analysts, guide book creators, directory publishers and the 
like create classification schemes which they then impose on groups of objects (films, 
companies, restaurants, mutual funds) to be categorized for the benefits of the users 
(readers, investors, tourists).  When the objects being categorized are difficult to 
understand, these categorizers often take the role of expert interpreters, helping disparate 
groups understand particular categories by performing an evaluation of the objects within 
a particular category.  For example, restaurant critics evaluate whether restaurants are 
good or bad (Rao et al., 2005). 
    
2.3.3  Why Categories Are Created    
 The preceding discussions have all, implicitly or explicitly, been based on the 
notion that categories are created to improve understanding of the technical or social 
aspects of a particular world for users, objects, and categorizers.  While the process of 
categorization is understood, the ultimate issue of why categories are created remains an 
undertheorized one.  The common notion is that categories are created for improved 
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cognition via clear boundaries (Bowker et al., 2000; DiMaggio, 1987; Estes, 1994).  That 
is, separate from any plans of use of the classification scheme, the individual categories 
are designed to improve cognition by separating some objects from other objects. 
 Categories are also the basis of social ordering.  Indigenous tribes, for example, 
create categories to improve their understanding of their place in the world (Levi-Strauss, 
1968)).  Elites in social circles promote ‘high art’ to cement their superior social position 
(DiMaggio, 1987).  Governments create systems of apartheid to privilege certain groups 
of people over others (Bowker et al., 2000).  Even though the reasons behind the creation 
of these categories may be for self interest, the functional form of the categories is 
designed to create clarity among the different divisions.  For example, apartheid groups 
focus on rules such as the “one drop” rule to make a strong distinction against black and 
white.  The racial division of human beings is based on physical attributes designed to 
clarify who is in one group and who is in another.  Elites working to create art forms 
advertise specifically about what genres are their domain (classical music, opera, abstract 
art), because in order to be distinct from others, their artwork must also be distinct from 
more general representations (DiMaggio, 1987; DiMaggio & Pettit, 1999). 
 Furthermore, descriptions of how categories are created (invention, borrowing, 
and encounter) suggest that categories are created only when current categories do not 
match the cognitive needs of those using them (McAdam et al., 2001).  Thus, citizens in 
towns that have changed borders due to war or other issues develop new, blended social 
categories of citizenships as their old categories no longer work (Sahlins, 1991).  Mutual 
fund directories retire categories that no longer capture the different kinds of funds 
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currently being available, while adding new categories as new funds become available 
(Lounsbury et al., 2004).   
 Most research, in fact, focuses on the results of categorization precisely because 
the answer to, “why are categories created?” has been automatically assumed to be for 
improved understanding—that is, categories, are a cognitive simplification device.  As a 
result, most researchers focus on the consequences of categorization, taking the creation 
of categories for granted.  However, this leaves open the possibility that categories may 
not always exist for reasons of improving cognition.      
 One empirical example highlights this possibility by examining when categories 
change or disappear.  Lounsbury and Rao studied a mutual fund directory to determine 
when categories were created or reconstituted (Lounsbury et al., 2004).  They found that 
the directory paid attention to powerful mutual fund companies in deciding whether or 
not to keep a category which had few members.  Categories dominated by powerful 
mutual fund companies lasted longer than those that did not have such members.  The 
authors suggest that this was because of the mutual dependence between the creator of 
the directory, who needed mutual funds in order to publish the directory, and the mutual 
fund firms, which wanted to be listed in a way that made them most favorable.  This 
suggests that created categories may remain even if they are no longer improving 
cognition.  However, it does not directly address the possibility of categorizers creating 
categories for strategic reasons.  In fact, research has in general ignored the possibility 
that categories could be created strategically, in the form of ambiguous categories which 
do not add to understanding.   
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2.4  The Role of the Classification Scheme     
 The possibility of the creation of ambiguous categories has important implications 
for our understanding of classification in general.  Categories gain meaning not simply 
for their own attributes in isolation, but also because of attributes across the entire 
scheme (Zerubavel, 1991, 1996).  Categories have meaning in relation to other categories.   
For example, we understand a chair not only by knowing the attributes of a chair, but also 
knowing that a chair is not a table, bird, or car.  This example separates chairs from many 
different kinds of objects.  But one could imagine a classification scheme that separates 
chairs from tables, dressers, and sofas.  And one could imagine a further scheme that 
separated chairs into side chairs and armchairs.  Without understanding the entire scheme 
of categories, it is difficult to understand what aspect of meaning is being discussed.   
 Focusing on classification schemes offers a unique way to address the issue of 
referent categories.  While classification schemes have been studied as a particular type 
of classification, they have generally been overlooked by researchers, who focus more on 
informal categories, or, when using classification schemes as a data source, focus on 
categories within a classification scheme as if they are informal categories representing a 
larger cognitive map (Lounsbury et al., 2004; Rao & Monin, 2007; Rao et al., 2005; 
Zuckerman, 1999).  Classification schemes offer a unique perspective on categorization 
research in general because they offer an entire scheme of fixed categories—that is, the 
appropriate referent categories for understanding are included for classification schemes.  
Classification schemes also benefit because the roles of categorizer, object, and user are 
separated, allowing the potential to examine the influence of these roles separately. 
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2.5  Conclusion   
 Categorization underlies much of human thought and action.  Lumping and 
splitting objects has important consequences not only for users of the categories, but also 
for the objects as well.  For categorized objects, categorization determines and solidifies 
their identity, how they are valued, and what resources accrue to them.  It helps chart a 
course of acceptable action for them.  For users, categorization determines the 
expectations they have for individual objects, the value of those objects, and identifies the 
objects that are to be known.    
 Most research on categorization takes the underlying categories as a given, 
focusing instead on the consequences of categorization.  That is, studies that examine the 
consequences of categorization assume that the underlying categories clearly convey 
information about the categorized objects.  This is because classification is generally 
perceived to be an act of cognitive simplification.  Categories are created for improving 
the understanding of the categorized objects.  However, research has shown that 
categories remain in use even when they may no longer be giving information.  This 
occurs when keeping those categories is vital to preserving power relationships between 
the categorizers and the categorized.  While this occurs after the categories have been 
created, such events leave open the possibility that categories may be created strategically 
in addition to being used strategically.   
 My dissertation addresses this gap by suggesting that organizations can and do 
create categories for reasons other than improving cognition in certain situations.  By 
focusing on classification schemes, I am able to examine when categories may be created 
for strategic reasons.  By doing so, I am also able to highlight the role of the categorizer.  
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Prior literature has addressed actions of categorizers, noting that institutions, for example, 
impose categories by virtue of their legitimate power.  In the following chapters, I focus 
on the perspective of the categorizer in the creation of the classification scheme.   
 In addition to examining when strategic category creation may occur, I also push 
the literature further by examining the implications of this behavior, which has thus far 
been ignored by researchers.   Categorizers may indeed strategically create classification 
schemes, but what impact does this have on users?  Users are typically seen as the 
ultimate reason for the scheme in the first place:  classification schemes help users of the 
scheme better understand their world—hence why issues of inappropriate use of 
categories become extremely important when they are revealed.  Yet no research has 






   
3.1  Overview 
 As suggested in the prior chapter, research on the act of classification has greatly 
increased the understanding of categorized objects, and in particular, the behavior of 
those objects as a result of their classification.  Yet such a focus often ignores both the 
categorizer and the composition of the classification scheme itself.  As a result, most 
research focuses on issues of placement:   if the object is unambiguous, it can be placed 
in a category and thus understood.  Such reasoning implies that each category is clearly 
defined.  Yet categories within a scheme may be overlapping or unclear.  In these cases, 
the meaning of any individual category in isolation may seem plausible, but when placed 
in juxtaposition with other categories, the meaning of the categories becomes confused.   
I call such schemes ambiguous.  Formally defined, an ambiguous classification scheme is 
one where individual categories overlap in meaning, allowing a single object to be placed 
in multiple categories without violating any of the rules of the classification scheme 
(Ruef 2007, Abbott 1997).2   That is, ambiguous classification schemes have overlapping 
categories, while unambiguous classification schemes have categories that do not overlap. 
                                                 
2 It is important to clarify between ambiguous creation of classification schemes and ambiguous usage of 
classification schemes.  Ambiguous category creation involves creating a set of categories which are not 
analytically distinct from each other.  Ambiguous usage of a classification scheme occurs when many objects 
with dissimilar attributes are lumped into the same category.  For example, when organizations declining in 
market share and with no profits are rated a “Market Outperformer,” and organizations with high profits 
and increasing market share are also rated a “Market Outperformer,” the category of “Market 
Outperformer” is used in an ambiguous manner.  On the other hand, when “Market Outperformer” exists in 
the same classification scheme as “Overweight” and “Buy,” the classification scheme itself can be said to be 
ambiguously created, because the same organization can be placed in multiple categories.  My paper 
concerns the creation of ambiguous classification schemes, not the ambiguous use of categories. 
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This is because meaning occurs not only through an assessment of the attributes of a set 
of objects within a single category, but also through an understanding of the interplay of 
all possible categories (Bowker et al., 2000; Goodman, 1992; Porac & Thomas, 1994). 
 This chapter brings into focus the issue of classification scheme creation through 
a focus on the composition of the scheme.  By examining the conditions under which 
categorizers create ambiguous classification schemes, I begin to fill the gap in our 
understanding of classification scheme creation, but also in our understanding of 
categorizer decision making in the first place.  While ambiguous classification schemes 
could occur by accident, the fact that classification schemes are created, not discovered, 
leaves open the possibility of strategic action.  In this chapter, I suggest situations in 
which the creator of a scheme might deliberately choose to create an ambiguous 
classification scheme, rather than a clear one. 
 In the following sections, I adopt the perspective of the categorizer in exploring 
some explanations for why ambiguous schemes are created.   Categorizers create 
classification schemes, yet their role has been largely ignored in the research on 
organizational classification (but see Lounsbury & Rao 2004 for an exception).  I 
examine how interactions between categorizers, objects and users as well as the 
interactions among multiple categorizers may influence the level of ambiguity in the 
classification scheme.   I suggest that ambiguity increases when there is a conflict of 
interest between the categorizer and its users as well as when the categorizer occupies an 
elite position in the market for classification. 
 
3.2  Users, Objects, and Classification Scheme Creation 
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   Even though a classification scheme is a frame with a point of view determined 
by the categorizer, its creators take into account both user and object expectations when 
designing the scheme.  Users assume that classification schemes are objective (Bowker et 
al., 2000; Lounsbury et al., 2004).  Users also expect classification schemes to clarify the 
meaning of a set of objects, although the taxonomy of an individual classification scheme 
may be left to the discretion of the categorizer (Lounsbury et al., 2004).   While users 
want a classification scheme that allows them to discriminate between objects, the objects 
focus more on the potential usage of the scheme.3  Classified objects want to be portrayed 
the way they see themselves, usually in the best possible classification.   
 In many classification schemes, the categorizer is separated from its users and the 
objects it classifies because the classification scheme is either non-revenue generating or 
generates revenue solely from user subscriptions.  In these situations, the categorizer is 
somewhat insulated from any pressures of objects for favorable classification.  In an 
idealized situation, the categorizer would simply look at the world of objects and would 
then place them in the appropriate categories according to the tenets of the classification 
scheme.     
 A conflict of interest, however, often exists between the categorizer and the users 
because objects may also be customers of categorizers.  It may be difficult for a 
categorizer to objectively classify an object if it has a relationship with it.  In practice, 
categorizers may accept payment from objects for services tangential to the classification, 
in addition to any revenues they may receive from users.  For example, firms may pay 
Google and other search engines to increase their position so that they appear as a 
                                                 
3 Again, object represents the organization that creates what is categorized.  For example, in stock market 
classification, the future performance of the stock is what is being classified, but it is the company whose 
stock is being evaluated that wants to be favorably classified. 
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member of a particular category or as well-placed within a particular category.  Users 
then interpret this as a best match.  Categorizers may offer advertising opportunities, such 
as when newspapers accept advertisements from movies that they then rate.  Categorizers 
may provide objects with advising services, generating revenue from their expertise in 
particular categories or through auxiliary services within the firm.  For example, 
brokerage firms may underwrite or offer consulting services to companies whose stocks 
they also rate as part of their objective market analysis. While such behavior allows the 
categorizer to generate multiple lines of revenue, it may also influence the categorizer to 
classify in ways that allow the categorizer maximum benefit, even at the possible expense 
of users. 
 This conflict of interest is further exacerbated by the power dynamics between 
objects and categorizers (Lounsbury et al., 2004).  When there are multiple categorizers 
in a particular market, the object can threaten to take its ancillary business elsewhere.  It 
can also refuse to give access to firm information for the categorizer, which can have 
implications for the categorizer’s ability to classify the object.  This can result in user 
dissatisfaction with the categorizer. 
 One way for categorizers to manage the push from objects for favorable 
classification is to classify some objects more favorably than they deserve.  For example, 
some investment firms rate stocks more favorably than other raters when they have an 
underwriting relationship with the company whose stock they are rating (Hayward et al., 
1998).  Merrill Lynch and Salomon Smith Barney (Citigroup) both faced scandals when 
they rated stocks positively while disparaging them in private.  Such activity, if 
discovered, has reputational and financial ramifications.  Both of these firms paid large 
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fines and the analysts in question were barred from working in the securities industry.  
Furthermore, such behavior risks alienating users, who expect objects to be honestly 
categorized. 
 Another way to deal with the pressures to classify objects in a particular way is to 
create a classification scheme that will create multiple opportunities for classification—
that is, an ambiguous classification scheme.  Ambiguity in general often has negative 
connotations due to a strong human preference for clarity.  Several studies show that the 
value of clarity is nontrivial.  In experimental settings, subjects have an ambiguity 
discount (that is, the price at which they are willing to place a bet given ambiguous rather 
than clear probabilities) ranging between 5% and 20% (Bernasconi & Loomes, 1993; 
MacCrimmon & Larsson, 1979; Yates & Zukowski, 1976) and at least one study up to 
60% (Becker & Brownson, 1964).  A study of auditors and the users of financial 
statements found that users reacted conservatively to ambiguous probabilities when 
determining whether or not potential future loss should be included in an auditor’s report 
(Nelson & Kenney, 1997).  Examining the stock market, (Zuckerman, 1999) finds that 
large diversified firms which cannot be easily categorized by analysts trade at a discount 
to those firms whose purpose is clear.  While this is not evidence of an ambiguity 
premium, it is evidence that investors pay less for the equities of firms they do not 
understand.  Ruef and Patterson find that ambiguous firms (denoted by a description 
including a miscellaneous object) received lower credit ratings than those whose 
descriptions were clear (Ruef & Patterson, 2007).  Gould argued that violence occurs 
when audiences cannot tell the difference between their position and another.  That is, 
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violence occurs as the result of confusion about social roles as perceived by those who 
enact those roles (Gould, 2003). 
 Yet ambiguity (including ambiguous classification schemes) can also be 
beneficial to organizations because of the way that humans process it.  At the level of the 
individual, the ability to be ambiguous is associated with increased performance and the 
preservation of role, status, or credibility.  These benefits occur when actors are able to 
craft an action or group of words with a sufficient amount of vagueness.  Both of these 
benefits come from allowing a single action to be interpreted favorably.  This increase in 
performance comes from the reduction of constraints in responding to a situation.  That is, 
ambiguity allows an actor to be flexible in his adaptation, while clarity often constrains 
him to a clearly identifiable role.   
 This positive benefit of ambiguity has many empirical examples.  Chess players, 
for example, who can maintain many lines of play within a single arrangement of pieces, 
perform better than those who choose a single line of action (Leifer, 1991).  These better 
performing players still make single moves, but each move is an advance in “many 
games at once.”  The strategy of remaining ambiguous until they find a situation where 
there is a clear best move allows them to respond better to their opponent.  Cosimo de 
Medici’s influential leadership was possible because he was able to maintain an 
ambiguous profile (Padgett et al., 1993).  A single action by Cosimo had many possible 
meanings, and so different audiences could interpret the meaning differently, and 
favorably, for their own situation.  Established actors perform better when they are able 
to become generalists later in their career (Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa, & Rittmann, 
2003a).  Although role specialization helps them become known, as they gain experience, 
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the number of roles to which they are appropriate dwindles.  Those who are able to break 
free from their specialized role identity have more opportunities for new projects.  
 Inside organizations, ambiguity can be seen as a way of building coalitions.  
Ambiguity may be “essential to organizing” because it allows multiple interpretations by 
multiple audiences (Eisenberg, 1984).  When ambiguous agendas are set, all actors feel 
that their goals are being taken into account, and consensus is easier to achieve (March, 
1994).  Ambiguous contracts allow the possibility of change and interpretation as projects 
evolve, and may allow for better outputs than specified contracts (Mukerji, 1998).    
 Ambiguity can also be used as a tactic to deal with external audiences of an 
organization.  Organizations often use ambiguous communication when dealing with 
potentially damaging situations because they want to avoid offending multiple audience 
members (Shuetz 1990).  Ambiguity forces audiences to rely on their own interpretations 
for meanings.  These interpretations are usually consistent with the user’s current 
worldview (DiMaggio, 1997; Goss & Williams, 1973; Sellnow & Ulmer, 1995).   Thus, 
the creator of ambiguity is able to benefit because its users will develop divergent 
interpretations.  Ambiguity allows an organization to be flexible, while clarity often 
constrains it to a clearly identifiable role.  As a result, actors who successfully use 
ambiguity are often able to increase their performance by increasing their options in 
responding to a situation (Leifer, 1991; Padgett et al., 1993).   
 An ambiguous classification scheme allows a categorizer many different ways to 
classify a particular object.  An ambiguous scheme may allow categorizers to placate 
objects by creating several possible categories in which it might fit.  This action 
reinforces the relationship it has with the object, but it also allows it to keep users who 
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will create their own meaning for the ambiguous categories.  Theatre critics may divide 
some theatres into experimental and avant-garde.  Such a scheme allows a production to 
be ‘correctly’ placed in multiple categories, leaving open the opportunity for the show to 
be the best “experimental” show of the year, even though it was similar to  many shows 
labeled avant-garde.  This keeps advertising theatres happy, and maintains the 
newspaper’s ability to gain valuable and newsworthy information from the theatre 
companies.  In equity rating systems, having multiple overlapping categories allows 
investment banks to place equities into a positive-sounding category or create movement 
within categories, which can appear favorable even if the equity is not the strongest 
performer relative to others that also receive positive ratings.  As a result, the investment 
bank reinforces its relationship with lucrative underwriting and banking clients.  Investors 
interpret differences between the categories and use the writing within the research report 
to justify their decisions. 
 The ambiguity of the classification scheme is likely to increase as the categorizer 
has more and more of a conflict of interest relative to its size.  Although audiences may 
tolerate ambiguity, they have a threshold for valuing it.  Too much ambiguity results in 
devaluation (Becker et al., 1964; Bernasconi et al., 1993; Camerer & Weber, 1992).   If 
the activity creating the conflict of interest is a rare event, categorizers should be less 
likely to take the risk of being discounted by being overly ambiguous, as the benefit to 
pleasing a few objects is less likely to outweigh the potential cost of alienating multiple 
users.  As there are more conflict of interest relationships, however, both the pressure to 
maintain these relationships as well as the benefits for doing so increase and may equal or 
outweigh the desire to serve the users. 
39 
 This suggests the following hypothesis: 
H1:  The greater the relationships creating a conflict of interest for the categorizer, 
the greater the ambiguity of the classification scheme. 
 
3.3  The Role of Other Categorizers 
 The prior hypothesis focused on how incentives might encourage a single 
organization to use an ambiguous classification scheme to deal with users and objects.  
However, the effect of conflict of interest is likely to vary according to the status of the 
categorizer itself.  This occurs because of the inherent risk of choosing ambiguity as a 
strategy. 
 In classification, ambiguity is an attractive option to categorizers with a conflict 
of interest because it allows them flexibility and control (White, 1992).  While audiences 
are likely to attempt to develop a meaning for the classification scheme, they may not be 
able to do so.  When audiences are unable to determine a meaning for an ambiguous 
experience, they are likely to discount it altogether (Mukerji, 1998; Pulford & Colman, 
2007).  As the ambiguity of the classification scheme increases, categorizers risk 
alienating users even as they may placate the objects that they classify.  The ability to 
share information in an accessible way to users is the hallmark of a good classification 
scheme—as well as adherence to norms of classification, which suggest that self-serving 
classification is taboo (DiMaggio, 1987).  In order to gain acceptance for their 
classification scheme, categorizers need users to accept an ambiguous classification 
scheme.  Categorizers with a conflict of interest can develop a more ambiguous 
classification scheme to the extent that they are higher status because of the role status 
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plays in user acceptance.  This occurs because users are most willing to tolerate 
ambiguity from a high status categorizer.4  Thus, while having a conflict of interest may 
encourage categorizers to create ambiguous schemes, the effect of conflict of interest 
varies by status.   
 In general, status is most valuable in markets where quality cannot be clearly 
observed (Podolny, 1994; Podolny, 1993).  Industries where firms act as market 
intermediaries by creating classification schemes, such as in financial services, are ones 
in which quality is inherently uncertain.  The need for a classification scheme in the first 
place indicates that information may be difficult to obtain or correctly interpret.  
Classification schemes are created by organizations when a set of objects is uncertain.  
They are designed to give clarity to that world.  However, the categorizers themselves 
operate in an uncertain environment because the metrics for evaluating quality among 
categorizers are frequently contentious (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Espeland & Stevens, 
1998b; Stake, 2006).  In these situations, status is a helpful way to discern between 
different actors. 
 In general, higher status has been shown to give many benefits to those who 
possess it.  High status actors have increased market share and increased margins on their 
sales (Podolny, 1993; Podolny & Phillips, 1996).  They are leaders in market activities 
                                                 
4 My focus here is on the moderating relationship that status has on conflict of interest.  It is not clear that 
high status actors would, independent of a conflict of interest, desire to create ambiguous classification 
schemes.  With higher status also comes the desire to protect and enhance that status, which often means 
that high status actors are more likely to choose a course of action that preserves their status, rather than 
one that might risk destroying it (Podolny 2008).  Schemes labeled as ambiguous may be interpreted as 
self-serving, and thus may negatively affect the reputation of the categorizer, much as deliberate mis-
categorization might.  On the other hand, high status actors may desire the flexibility that an ambiguous 
classification scheme would provide.  Rather than examining the role of status, which has been 
exhaustively studied in other settings, my main interest is in arguing that classification schemes are created 
for strategic reasons, and thus I focus solely on the conflict of interest relationship and the effect of status 
within the frame of that conflict of interest. 
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(Lounsbury, 2002; Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007).  These benefits 
accrue to the high status actor because other marketplace participants perceive them to be 
valuable in part because of their high regard, not just through their actions or observed 
quality.  In fact, market actors and outsiders are biased in favor of high status actors 
(Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953).  In experimental data, 
individuals rated the statements attributed to high status actors as more trustworthy and of 
higher quality than the exact same statements attributed to lower status actors (Hovland et 
al., 1953).  As a result of this high regard, high status actors have a certain amount of 
flexibility in their actions.  High status actors, more so than middle status actors, can 
make choices precisely because their status affords them a certain shield (Phillips & 
Zuckerman, 2001; Sanders et al., 2007).   
 In classification, for categorizers with a conflict of interest, ambiguous 
classification schemes may allow them flexibility in the face of categorized objects; 
however, such classification schemes may be interpreted as creating intentional confusion.  
Those categorizers that are also high status can create an ambiguous classification 
scheme that still attracts users.  This occurs because users are still likely to desire an 
affiliation with a high status partner even if they do not understand the actions of that 
actor because such affiliations improve their own status (Benjamin et al., 1999; Chung, 
Singh, & Lee, 2000).  Thus, users may substitute the status of the categorizer for an 
understanding of the scheme itself.  Instead of evaluating the scheme on its ability to 
clarify the world, they assume that because a high status actor created it, it must be 
valuable.  In this way, high status categorizers with a conflicts of interest can be even 
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more ambiguous than their low status counterparts because the attention focused on their 
actions is likely to be perceived in a favorable light. 
 Conversely, firms with heavy conflict of interest relationships but lower status 
firms may see a benefit to ambiguity, but the risks of choosing such a scheme are greater 
for them than they are for high status firms.  In general, low status firms are thought to 
operate largely invisibly within a marketplace (Benjamin et al., 1999; Phillips et al., 
2001).  While it is true that a more ambiguous classification scheme by a low status firm 
may not be noticed by the market at large, such an action is likely to be noticed by 
current users.  With fewer users and less visibility than higher status firms, categorizers 
cannot risk the possibility that users may discount the scheme because it is ambiguous, 
even though such a scheme may give them flexibility to placate categorized objects.  The 
loss of users is more devastating for these firms because they have fewer options for 
attracting new ones.  Fewer users also may discourage ancillary services the categorizer 
may wish to offer to categorized objects, for which visibility through the classification 
scheme is a priority.  Furthermore, even users who stay may be less willing to pay for the 
services of the lower status categorizer.  Thus, a low status brokerage firm with 
underwriting business (a conflict of interest) risks losing its brokerage clients if it chooses 
an ambiguous scheme, and such schemes may also cause it to lose underwriting business 
as well, since underwriting clients want the visibility created by a (favorable) rating and 
analyst coverage. 
 The prior discussion suggests that status has a moderating effect on conflict of 
interest. 
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H2:  The interaction between status and conflict of interest is positive:  
categorizers with high levels of conflict of interest and high status will create 
more ambiguous classification schemes than other actors. 
 
3.4  Alternative Explanations 
 This chapter suggests that categorizers may strategically create ambiguity.  
However, there may be other reasons that ambiguous classification schemes may appear.  
First, ambiguous classification schemes may appear because of categorizer inexperience.  
That is, categorizers may want to create clear classification schemes, but may not 
understand how to do so, or may believe that their scheme is readily interpretable when in 
fact audiences do not understand it.  Second, ambiguous classification schemes may 
simply reflect the difficulties of categorizing a particular set of objects.  If the objects 
have many different facets, and categorizers feel that they need to address them all, a 
classification scheme may become ambiguous simply through the inclusion of multiple 
elements.  I will control for these alternative explanations in my models. 
 
3.5  Summary 
 This chapter argues that while prevailing theories of categorization suggest that 
categories are designed for perceptual clarity by users, in fact, when organizations are 
categorizers, clarity may not always be the intention.  Ambiguous classification schemes 
can occur when categorizers have a conflict of interest between their own interests and 
that of their users, but this effect varies by the status of the categorizer.  This chapter has 
focused on reasons internal to the categorizer that may lead a categorizer to choose 
ambiguity.  While having a conflict of interest or many users creates the incentives for 
44 
ambiguity, status may create the opportunity for ambiguity.  The prescription from this 
chapter seems to be that all categorizer that can should attempt to be as ambiguous as 
possible, since ambiguity allows them flexibility.  But is this true?  While the choice to 
create any scheme may be free, the performance of that classification scheme does not 
rest solely within the categorizer’s control.  The next chapter discusses what determines 
the impact of the scheme on the categorizer’s ability to attract users.  By looking at 
ambiguity and other factors as they relate to the performance of the categorizer, it is 






THEORY AND HYPOTHESES, II 
4.1  Overview 
 The prior chapter of the dissertation suggested that classification schemes, in 
some situations, would be created ambiguously, rather than in a way that increases the 
clarity of the categorized objects.  I hypothesized that categorizers likely to create 
ambiguous schemes were those who had both the incentive (via a conflict of interest) and 
the ability (via high status) to do so.  Ambiguous classification schemes allowed these 
categorizers to be attractive to particular categorized objects by creating many different 
ways to classify objects. 
 In this chapter, I turn to the larger question of whether these actions have an 
impact on user attention.  That is, classification schemes are generally considered to be 
created as clarification devices that help structure markets of classified objects (Bowker 
et al., 2000; Douglas et al., 1992; Zhao, 2005).  Scheme creators act as critics of a 
particular market, providing information and simplifying cognition for users (customers) 
of that market (Hsu et al., 2005; Zuckerman, 1999).  Investors use equity rating systems 
to differentiate between multiple equities.  Diners use restaurant classifications to 
understand what kinds of cuisine exist in a given locale and how good those restaurants 
may be.  Drivers use product guides to learn the difference between different types of 
vehicles.    
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 Prior research has focused strongly on the information benefits of classification 
schemes.  Classification schemes make different kinds of objects commensurable by 
placing them in the same category (Breiger, 2005; Espeland & Stevens, 1998a): both The 
Spotted Pig, a pub, and Babbo, an upscale restaurant by famed chef Mario Batali, rate a 
single star in the latest edition of the Michelin Guide.  Group membership provides a 
reference group, allowing users to better understand the actions of an object in a 
particular category by the actions of other objects within that category.  To continue the 
prior example, diners expect a high quality of food from both The Spotted Pig and Babbo, 
because both belong to the same category.  Having experienced food at one or the other, 
they would have similar expectations via the category membership. 
 For objects categorized within a classification scheme, category membership 
helps define legitimate actions for them, and separates other actions or attributes as 
unacceptable for membership (Porac et al., 1994; Porac et al., 1989).   The act of 
categorization itself is important as it renders categorized objects known—being difficult 
to categorize results in users of the scheme devaluing objects, at best, or not knowing 
about them at all, at worst (Rao et al., 2005; Ruef et al., 2007; Zuckerman, 1999).  For 
example, in the 1990s, firms that de-diversified often cited analysts not understanding 
how to categorize them as a factor in their decision to restructure the firm (Zuckerman, 
2000).  Category membership also helps firms understand the competitive landscape, 
knowing which firms are competitive threats and which operate using different strategic 
principles (Peteraf et al., 1997). 
 Thus, it is well-established that the information contained within a classification 
scheme—that is, the use of a classification scheme, is beneficial to users and categorized 
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objects.  Yet the value of the classification scheme itself to those who create it is not as 
clear.  If the Michelin Guide used something other than its 0 to 3 star rating, would diners 
still buy it?   In the prior chapter, I suggested that organizations strategically create 
classification schemes.  But do such schemes affect the performance of the organization 
that creates it?  And more generally, does the configuration of the classification scheme 
matter for the categorizers at all?   
 I answer this question by examining the performance of the categorizer as 
determined by aspects of its scheme.  Performance is perhaps the fundamental strategic 
outcome:  most theories of strategic management attempt to uncover what drives 
increased performance, whether that is survival, profits, or return on assets.  In this 
chapter, I focus on user response, measured here as customer accounts.  At some level, 
most measures of performance capture customer response, as measured in return on 
assets or profit, because customers are usually the ones providing the revenue of an 
organization.  Thus, customers are at the very heart of any organization—without them, 
the organization may cease to exist.  Rather than focusing on accounting based measures, 
I focus on actual customer (user) accounts because classification schemes are designed to 
capture user attention and assist users.  Therefore, measuring their departure or arrival is 
an accurate measure of the performance of the categorizer5. 
                                                 
5 My focus on the change in customer accounts is based on the assumption that the goal of most 
categorizers is to increase their customer accounts.  It is theoretically possible that some categorizers may 
wish to pursue activities that would improve performance without increasing the number of customer 
accounts.  For example, categorizers might attempt to change the net value of their existing accounts, or 
they might choose to switch customer segments in a way that would result in a net loss of customers.  In 
general, however, categorizers rely on customers who purchase their products by fee.  The only way for 
these categorizers to increase revenues is to increase customer numbers.  It is possible that categorizers that 
focus on certain customer segments might tend to rely relatively heavily on increasing customer accounts, 
while other categorizers tend to rely on other methods of improving performance.  For example, brokerage 
firms that focus on retail clients may find it easier to increase customer accounts than those focused 
primarily on institutional customers.  I will control for these different foci in the ensuing investigations. 
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 Focusing on the effects of the classification scheme on user response also 
complements research which has suggested that categorizers may be self interested, but 
has not examined how users respond to such behavior.  Research has suggested that 
categories within classification schemes may be maintained in order to preserve 
important relationships between the categorized objects and the categorizer (Lounsbury et 
al., 2004).  Such behavior benefits the categorizer by maintaining its access to potential 
objects to place in the classification scheme.  Categorizers have also received fines for 
deliberately miscategorizing objects, such as those levied on equity research firms by the 
2001 Global Research Settlement (Kessler, 2004; Reingold, 2006).  Yet it is not clear 
whether users notice or respond to such actions.    
 That categorizer actions would lead to increases or decreases in performance (as 
measured by user attention) is hardly a novel idea when looked at more generally.  
Choices by firms in terms of product mix, location, and service form the basis of studies 
in strategy (Poppo & Zenger, 1998; Ruef, 1997; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).  These 
are augmented by studies which suggest customers respond to reputational concerns, 
departing when they feel associations with a firm might taint their own reputation (Jensen, 
2006).  Yet it is not clear that a classification scheme is necessarily like these other firm 
activities.  Firms that work as critics are usually seen as competing on information:  the 
ability to give thorough, timely, or unique information, and accurately grouping objects 
within a particular category (Hsu, 2006b; Shrum, 1991).  Thus, the drivers of 
performance might be logically seen as the information or the use of the scheme.  The 
configuration of that scheme has, thus far, been taken for granted.  
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 In this chapter, I argue that the configuration of the classification scheme does 
indeed matter for the categorizers who create them.  I suggest that the scheme itself 
serves two purposes:  first, it is an ordering device.  As a result, schemes which do not 
order well lose users.  Second, the scheme is a cultural artifact.  Choice of a scheme links 
categorizers with an industry and furthermore provides a set of legitimate groupings that 
help users appropriate value and understand the organizations that create the schemes in 
addition to the information provided within the scheme itself.  In particular, drawing on 
literature from institutional theory as well as understanding of cognitive schemas, I 
examine how the legitimacy, similarity, and ambiguity of the scheme affect the change in 
customer accounts from year to year. 
 It is important to place boundary conditions around this investigation.  My 
argument applies to situations in which a formal classification scheme has been created 
by an organization for the purpose of ordering a particular market.  These classification 
schemes include rating systems, product directories, restaurant guides, and so on.  In each 
of these cases, organizations create schemes because the objects that will be placed 
within the classification scheme are complex to understand, and markets for valuing them 
may be uncertain.  These categorizers hope to attract users (customers) who will use their 
classification scheme as part of a larger decision-making process. 
 
4. 2  Classification Schemes as Ordering Devices 
 As I have discussed in prior chapters, a classification scheme is a set of categories 
which divide a given world of objects into (ideally) discrete boxes (Bowker et al., 2000).  
This occurs through a process of “lumping and splitting”—like objects are grouped 
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together and separated from unlike objects (Zerubavel, 1991, 1996).  Users who 
encounter a classification scheme can look at the different objects and take action based 
on their assessment of the different groupings.  Thus, the categories themselves serve as 
devices which highlight similarities among members of the same category, while 
differentiating them from other categories (Hsu, Negro, & Perretti, 2007).   
 In the prior chapter, ambiguity described the relationship of individual categories 
within a scheme to each other.  Given that this relationship may have an impact on the 
comprehension of categories within the scheme, choosing such a scheme may also have 
an impact on firm performance, to the extent that users may prefer schemes that they can 
develop a meaning for.  Ambiguity works on a continuum.  At one end is a scheme that is 
completely distinct, with harsh boundaries between the categories.  As the category 
boundaries are increasingly blurred, the ambiguity of the scheme increases.  I hypothesize 
an inverted U relationship between ambiguity and performance. 
 Classification schemes that create harsh boundaries around a given set of 
categories are likely to best differentiate the categories within the scheme.  That is, 
schemes for which there is a clear definitional boundary should most easily differentiate 
objects.  Yet in reality, such harsh boundaries are often difficult to maintain, due to the 
fact that categorized objects often share or borrow attributes with objects in other 
categories (Rao et al., 2005; Rao & Sivakumar, 1999; Sahlins, 1991).  For example, 
restaurants which wanted to incorporate elements of nouvelle cuisine and classical 
French cooking slowly eroded the purity of those categories, causing difficulty in rating 
those restaurants (Rao et al., 2007; Rao et al., 2005).   As a result, particularly in 
classification markets where objects are uncertain, especially distinct classification 
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schemes may be difficult to deploy, as objects may be complex.  While users may 
appreciate the idea of clear boundaries, once objects are placed into them, the categories 
may become confusing. 
 As defined in the prior chapter, a classification scheme with many overlapping 
categories, such that an object with a single set of characteristics can match multiple 
categories at once, is said to be ambiguous.  While user perceptions of a distinct 
classification scheme seem obvious, user perceptions of an ambiguous one are less clear.  
This occurs because, when first presented with ambiguity, most individuals attempt to 
develop a meaning for the ambiguous communication (Eisenberg, 1984; Sellnow et al., 
1995; Ulmer & Sellnow, 1997).  The interpretation developed tends to be consistent with 
the worldview of the individual (DiMaggio, 1997; Sellnow et al., 1995).  Thus, 
organizations that create ambiguous communications can appeal to multiple stakeholders 
with conflicting demands.   
 However, other research suggests that, when faced with overwhelming ambiguity, 
rather than develop their own worldview, individuals tend to discount the ambiguous 
communication entirely, making it less valuable than a clearer alternative.  That is, many 
people exhibit strategic ambiguity aversion (Pulford et al., 2007; Segal, 1987; Viscusi & 
Chesson, 1999).  This is likely to be especially true in situations where users of the 
scheme can imagine clearer alternatives.  Thus, when faced with a single ambiguous 
classification scheme, an individual might attempt to develop a meaning for the scheme.  
On the other hand, when alternatives for schemes exist, a user may be less likely to 
develop an explanation, and may instead discount the scheme altogether.  This suggests 
that there is a threshold for ambiguous classification schemes:  a certain amount of 
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ambiguity, and users may interpret it as nuance.  Too much ambiguity, and users interpret 
it as nonsense. 
 Thus, in an uncertain market with competition, at low levels of ambiguity, the 
classification scheme is constraining, and distinct bins lead to problems with placement, 
which may lead to user dissatisfaction.  Moderately ambiguous schemes, on the other 
hand, can be favorably interpreted by multiple parties, who tend to see the categories as 
matching their world view.  On the other end of the continuum, highly ambiguous 
schemes, particularly in a competitive market, are easily discounted for clearer 
alternatives.  Thus: 
H3:  The relationship between ambiguity and customer accounts follows an 
inverted U:  at low and high levels of ambiguity, the change in customer accounts 
is lower than at moderate levels of ambiguity. 
 
4.3  Classification Schemes and Similarity 
 Competition among the schemes of different categorizer creates a market for 
classification.  Categorizers compete for users on at least three dimensions:  the 
composition of the scheme, the ability of the categorizer to place objects in the scheme, 
and the information they convey to users within the scheme itself.  But unlike markets for 
tangible products, such as cars or hotels, the market for classification schemes is first a 
competition of meaning.   That is, before categorized objects are shared with users, the 
categorizer must settle on the kind of scheme it will use to examine those objects.  The 
prior hypothesis examined how the categories within a particular scheme may affect 
customer response.  In this section, I examine how the relationship of those category 
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choices to other categorizers’ choices affect customer response.  That is, users make 
decisions based on their understanding of a particular scheme, but they also compare that 
scheme to other schemes that may occur. 
 The classification scheme represents a particular view for sorting a given set of 
objects.  Categorizers choose both the number of categories and the labels that identify 
those categories—as well as attributes that define category membership.  These choices 
can be culturally rooted (Bowker et al., 2000; Durkheim et al., 1972 (1963); Varnedoe, 
1990) as well as strategic (Lounsbury et al., 2004; Porac et al., 1999).  As a result, 
classification schemes for the same kinds of objects often differ across different 
categorizers.  For example, the classification scheme for wines in France focuses on 
geographic production area, while the classification scheme for wines in America focuses 
on grape varietal (Zhao, 2005).  Each scheme could easily have chosen the other—
different French wines use different kinds of grapes, and American wines can be 
distinguished according to the state in which they are produced.  The choice of the 
scheme, then, represents a choice about the salient attributes to describe a given set of 
objects and the level at which to describe them (Bowker et al., 2000).  French wine, for 
example, focuses on a domain, rather than individual cities or larger regional areas.   
 Yet beyond the objects that are categorized, classification schemes create a way 
of sorting categorizers as well.  Whenever there are multiple categorizers in a given 
market, the classification scheme becomes a way for categorizers to differentiate or 
assimilate to other categorizers’ conceptions of the categorized objects.  Markets are 
socially constructed through producers’ examinations of each other’s choices (White, 
1981).  The choices of a producer based on dimensions in the market signal to others 
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what kind of organization it is.  For White, these dimensions were price and quality.  But 
for others, there have been other dimensions, including service, geography and styling 
(Baum & Haveman, 1997; Porac et al., 1994; Porac et al., 1989).  The collective result of 
these producer actions is set of market niches in which firms compete and which 
customers see as distinct ways of creating a particular product (Polos, Hannan, & Carroll, 
2000; Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton, & Kanfer, 1995).  For example, Scottish knitwear 
manufacturers occupy a niche based on location (Scotland), style (classic), and quality 
(high) (Porac et al., 1995; Porac et al., 1989). 
 Thus categorizers make their choices based on their own beliefs about how to 
view a set of objects, but also based on their understanding of how other categorizers 
view the same set of objects.   White’s observation that producers attempt to array 
themselves into different niches based their own resource endowments and their views of 
the outputs of other producers suggests that the key to competitive survival is 
differentiation:  choose a niche, or in this case a scheme, that is very different from others, 
which carves out a unique space where others cannot compete.   This assures access to a 
unique stream of resources, which will lead to user attention and survival.  Choosing a 
position highly similar to rivals means competition for scarce resources. 
 In markets for classification, this suggests that categorizers that change their 
schemes in an attempt to become more similar to other categorizers are likely to perform 
worse than if they attempt to differentiate themselves.  In general, changing to a new 
scheme is risky.  Poorer performance may ensue because a change in a scheme requires a 
categorizer to recalibrate its prior classifications.  Doing so can be difficult, and can result 
in changed evaluations as categorizers attempt the translation.  For example, when a 
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stock market analyst changes firms, it can be difficult to figure out how to translate his 
prior ratings to the new system.  Dan Reingold remarked that changing companies meant 
“a lot of work to do getting ready….  I didn’t intend any dramatic ratings changes, but I 
still had to write new reports and explain my reasoning on every stock I covered”  
(Reingold, 2006).  Although this represents the experience of one analyst changing 
companies, an entire brokerage firm changing schemes would require extreme amounts 
of effort to translate the ratings, as well as difficulties and changes understanding and 
adapting to the new system.   
 The change process can be difficult for any kind of a scheme change. Yet 
difficulties are likely to be exacerbated when the new scheme is highly similar to other 
schemes.  A change to a differentiated scheme offers an ability to attract users through 
advertising a new way of seeing.  Choosing a differentiation strategy in general requires 
education of customers (Baum et al., 1997), since it is unlikely that customers will have a 
well-formed notion of how a differentiated product (in this case, classification scheme) 
works.  Such education efforts may attract customer attention and interest.  In addition, 
changing to a scheme that is less like others allows categorizers to capture a unique space 
in ways of seeing.  Conversely, changing to a scheme more similar to others in the 
industry could signal to users that the categorizer “got it wrong” the first time and is 
trying to imitate other, more successful categorizers.  It also forces the categorizer to 
compete for the use of labels that already have well defined conceptions due to their 
common usage; this forces the categorizer to adopt to those conceptions. 
 In addition, as a categorizer chooses a scheme that is more similar to all other 
schemes in a differentiated industry, it risks confusing users, who do not know how to 
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interpret the combination of categories.  For example, equity research categories often 
divide into groups using labels that are a call for action (“buy” or “sell”) and labels that 
are descriptive (“market performer” or  “market underperformer”).  A brokerage firm that 
attempts to become more similar to all firms will need to incorporate categories from 
both descriptive and action labels.  Such a scheme can be difficult for investors to 
interpret, as it loses internal coherence. 
 This prior discussion suggests the following hypothesis: 
H4:  The interaction between new schemes and similarity is negative:  
categorizers that change their scheme to a more similar scheme gain fewer 
customer accounts than those who do not. 
 
4.4  Classification Schemes and Legitimacy 
 The prior hypothesis discussed how similarity might affect the user response to 
the categorizer’s classification scheme.  However, it is worth considering the implications 
for categorizers who share the exact same scheme as other categorizers.   
 The prevalence of a particular organizational choice or activity often suggests that 
the choice is legitimate, or seen as proper and desirable by an important audience 
(Suchman, 1995).  While innovative organizational choices are seen as improving some 
technical aspect of the adopting organization, as these choices diffuse throughout an 
organizational population, they become expected behavior (Fligstein, 1985; Westphal, 
1997; Westphal & Zajac, 1994).  As other adopters choose the same activity, they do so 
not for technical reasons, but because adoption offers the organization legitimacy.  That 
is, by adopting the same actions as others, the firm gains the approval of important 
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audiences and thus access to valuable resources.  Thus, organizations adopt poison pills 
or multidivisional forms because it is seen as adherence to a particular value orientation, 
not because it is necessarily more efficient (Fligstein, 1985).  Firms adopt long term 
incentive plans to appear to adhere to the principal of maximizing shareholder value, but 
the more organizations that have adopted them, the less likely the firms are to implement 
them (Westphal et al., 1994).  Underlying the notion of adoption is the larger issue of 
prevalence or frequency:  doing the same thing that many others in the same field do 
gives organizations legitimacy (Ruef & Scott, 1998).   
 Categorizers using the same scheme as others appear to be following cognitive 
norms, or rules about what types of structures or practices are allowed in the industry 
(Ruef et al., 1998).  That is, there are strongly held beliefs about how categorizers should 
behave.  They must be unbiased and fairly represent the objects that they categorize (Hsu, 
2006b; Lounsbury et al., 2004).  Having a frequently used scheme suggests that the 
categorizer is following structural norms of how classification schemes should look.  
Users may further assume that such a scheme is likely to be used in an appropriate way.   
The choice of a frequently used scheme suggests to users that the categorizer conforms to 
a standard way of seeing the classified objects, and that it will fairly and objectively 
evaluate them.  Hence, critics, a subset of categorizers that confer value on objects 
through sorting them, gravitate to quality schemas that are well-structured, since they are 
better able to justify their critical skills in using well-known schemas (Hsu, 2006b).   
 Legitimacy is important for categorizers in general because classification schemes 
are most often deployed in markets where objects are not easily understood by potential 
customers (users).  Thus, user uncertainty exists at two levels.  First, users have 
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uncertainty about the categorized objects themselves.  Second, users have uncertainty 
about the classification scheme providers as well.  Because the objects are difficult to 
understand, users may have difficulty interpreting ex ante whether or not the categorizer 
is performing its job accurately and fairly.   Choosing a categorizer that uses the same 
scheme as other categorizers can reduce some of this uncertainty, because by picking a 
legitimate organization, users feel assured that the categorizer is following industry 
norms for classification.   
 Thus, a categorizer choosing a frequently used classification scheme is likely to 
gain more users because it is perceived as legitimate.  This suggests the following 
hypothesis: 
 H5:  The greater the frequency of the classification scheme, the greater the 
increase in customer accounts. 
 
 However, while the scheme itself may be seen as more legitimate when more 
categorizers use it, and thus may capture more users, increased frequency of the scheme 
also means increased competition.  When categorizers have exactly the same scheme, 
they are no longer competing on a particular vision of the world as defined by scheme 
selection.  Instead, the focus of customer attention changes.  Since users need not 
compare categorizer by the difference in their schemes, they can instead turn their 
attention to the categorizer’s use of the scheme.  Thus, categorizers with the same scheme 
compete on their ability to place objects within the scheme and provide valuable 
information.  Although users may be drawn to a scheme that is familiar and legitimate 
within an industry, users should be drawn most strongly to those firms that are also best 
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performing—that is, the ones that give the most useful information and the most accurate 
or timely placement of objects.6  This suggests that quality moderates the relationship of 
legitimacy. 
H6:  High performing categorizers that use frequently used schemes will gain  
more customer accounts than lower performing categorizers using frequently used 
schemes. 
 
4.5  Alternative Explanations 
 There are a number of alternative explanations for why a user might choose to 
join or leave a particular categorizer.  For example, merger activity may bring users from 
two firms together, increasing users but not through the choice of the users.  Second, 
users may choose a particular categorizer because it has high status in the industry.  
Finally, users may choose a categorizer because of other strategic efforts not related to 
the classification scheme, such as price or service.  I will control for these alternative 
explanations as much as possible in my analyses. 
 
4.6  Summary 
 This chapter suggests that classification schemes can have an impact on 
performance, specifically altering the number of users that a categorizer has as clients.  
Classification schemes provide information, sorting the world for users, but they are also 
                                                 
6 I specifically focus on quality in this section rather than status.  This is because when users are examining 
categorizers that share the exact same scheme, they are likely to be comparing firms based on actual 
information about which scheme is used.  Choosing a categorizer based on legitimacy of the scheme 
suggests a decision process in which multiple schemes are available to users for examination and for which 
the scheme is a deciding factor.  Thus, information about the scheme is being gathered and use of the 
scheme can be compared directly across categorizers.  On the other hand, choosing a categorizer based on 
status need not involve an understanding or observation of the scheme itself.  I test for an effect of status 
rather than quality as a robustness check in the next chapters. 
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tools for categorizers to attract business and show their skills at processing information.  
For this reason, both overly clear and overly ambiguous classification schemes may draw 
fewer customers than those that are moderately ambiguous.   
 However, it is not enough to look at only the configuration of an individual 
scheme.  Multiple classification schemes usually exist for categorizing a set of objects.  A 
particular categorizer’s scheme is thus compared to other categorizers’ schemes.  
Categorizers choose their schemes by looking at the choices of other categorizers, and 
molding their scheme in response.  Strategic changes to look more similar to many other 
schemes are likely to reduce the number of users that become clients of the categorizer, 
as highly similar schemes are likely to be confusing, and changes may be seen as a sign 
the categorizer is not as competent as the one it is imitating.  This is true because, when 
multiple different styles of classification schemes exist, being similar to all of them 
results in a disconnected scheme.  On the other hand, having the exact same scheme as 
several other categorizers can be helpful, especially if the categorizer is highly skilled.  
Using the same scheme creates legitimacy, but shifts the locus of competition from the 





MEASURES AND METHODS 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 The prior theoretical discussion and hypotheses develop two dependent variables, 
the degree of ambiguity and the change in user accounts of the categorizer.  In this 
chapter, I explain my planned analyses.  I begin with an extended discussion of my 
context.  I then discuss the measures and methods for each study.  Finally, I discuss the 
sources of my data. 
 
5.2  Industry Context 
 I use the equity rating systems from United States broker-dealers from 1993-1999 
as a setting in which to test my theory.   Equity rating systems are the set of categories 
that divide equities of publicly traded corporations based on their potential future 
performance.  Thus, they are classification systems based on quality.  Many include both 
horizontal and vertical categories.  The categories within each rating system designate 
positive, neutral, and negative opinions of the researchers, ostensibly based on the 
expected future performance of the equities themselves. 
 Equity rating systems are part of the larger genre of equity research.  Equity 
research can be divided into buy-side and sell-side research (Kessler, 2004; Reingold, 
2006).  Buy-side research is performed by large investment companies, such as mutual 
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funds or hedge funds.  These companies then buy equities, based on their research.  They 
make profits by purchasing investments that increase in value.  Sell-side equity research 
is performed by a wide variety of companies, from independent research organizations to 
full service financial institutions and investment banks.   For independent research 
organizations, the reports issued by their analysts form the sole activity of the 
organization.  True broker-dealers primarily serve as places for institutional investors and 
individuals to buy and sell stocks.  They often provide advising services for individual 
investors in the form of portfolio management services.  (Institutional investors often do 
this in-house.)  Their revenues come largely from commissions from buying and selling 
securities.  Banks also act as broker-dealers.  Banks offer a wide range of services for 
individuals, institutional investors, and firms.  They receive a large portion of their 
revenue from fee for service activities such as underwriting debt and equity offerings and 
supporting mergers and acquisitions (Eccles & Crane, 1998; Mizruchi & Stearns, 2001).   
 Equity research occurs as a service for the clients of all of these firms.  In theory, 
equity research is designed to help investors understand the performance of equities 
bought and sold on any of the major stock exchanges (Agrawal & Chen, 2005; Branson 
& Pagach, 2005; Clement, 1999; Kesner, Shapiro, & Sharma, 1994; McNichols et al., 
1997; Reingold, 2006).  The role of the analyst was created to help clients better process 
information.  Analysts specialize by industry, and often bring strong industry experience 
and knowledge to their position.  As a result, their understanding is valuable to individual 
investors, who may not understand complex financial and strategic statements, and 
institutional investors, who own stocks in many different industries and may not be able 
to understand the nuances of all industries. Investors use equity research in the hopes that 
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it will help them buy and sell equities profitably.  Equity analysts develop their research 
based on relationships with the companies they cover, analysis of the market, and 
proprietary financial modeling.  Equity analysts are barred from basing their reports on 
anything other than public knowledge—that is, analysts cannot make recommendations 
or forecasts based on insider information (Kessler, 2004; Reingold, 2006).   
 The result of equity research is the research report, issued quarterly, with updates 
as needed based on new information from the firm.  These research reports have three 
parts:  an analysis, an earnings forecast, and a rating.  The analysis is a description by the 
analyst of what the firm has accomplished and the analyst’s opinion what the firm and its 
market is likely to accomplish in the future.  The earnings forecast, often called the 
estimate, is a prediction for the firm’s earnings in the short term (often a prediction is also 
made for a longer horizon).  The rating is a categorization of the firm, ostensibly based on 
its predicted performance, that is a “summary judgment” of the other elements (personal 
interview). 
 Analysts carefully choose the firms that they cover.  No broker-dealer covers all 
possible equities/firms in a particular industry.  The average firm is covered by only five 
to seven analysts (Zuckerman, 1999), even though there are hundreds of analyst firms.  
Analysts focus on firms that fit neatly into a particular industry (Zuckerman, 1999; 
Zuckerman et al., 2003b).  They also prefer industries that have a fair number of firms 
(O'Brien & Bhushan, 1990).  The profitability of the industry for their clients also plays a 
role—as one director of research explained, “We don’t cover airlines.  They simply aren’t 
profitable investments for our clients.”  And analysts may prefer firms for which they 
already have favorable views (O'Brien et al., 2005).  These firms are usually strong 
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performers, because high (or increasing) performance is easier to forecast and rate than 
reduced performance.    
 Analysts at broker-dealers that provide underwriting services face a complicated 
role.  On the one hand, their duty is to properly describe the organizations as they see 
them.  This service is provided for the investors, who pay commissions to the broker-
dealer to buy and sell securities on their behalf. On the other hand, analysts are part of a 
larger organization which derives a great deal of revenue from its underwriting business.  
Underwriting occurs when banks assume the risk of an equity or bond issue.  
Simplistically, underwriting banks, in groups, purchase the shares from the selling firm 
and then resell them for an increased price.  That spread is profit for the organization.  In 
order to encourage investors to purchase the public offering, the equities being 
underwritten need to be evaluated positively, as this enhances the willingness of investors 
to pay for the new issue.  Analysts, because of their focus on a large number of equities 
within a specific industry, understand the landscape of competition within that industry.  
As a result, their insight can be very useful for investment clients.  This dual role often 
creates pressure for the analyst to issue a positive rating (O'Brien et al., 2005; Sieland, 
2003).   
 Little has been studied about the actual descriptive analysis that appears on the 
research report.  Instead, much more is known about how earnings forecasts are made and 
how ratings are given.   The reliability of these parts of the report is very important.  
Clients care that the forecasts are accurate, since they base decisions of material impact 
on them.   Individual equities rated by broker-dealers also care about the forecasts and 
ratings.  While the increase to a firm’s share price from a positive rating is minimal, the 
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decrease to the firm’s share price from a negative rating can be almost 10%, an effect that 
lingers for almost six months (Womack, 1996). 
 Earnings forecasts are ostensibly based on the prior performance of the firm as 
well as the current market conditions.  This also depends on the skill of the analyst.  
Highly ranked analysts outperform their peers in the ability to correctly forecast earnings 
(Stickel, 1992).  However, analysts themselves care about the forecasts because it 
determines their job prospects.  Analysts lose jobs for poor performance (Mikhail et al., 
1999), but they also have higher turnover when they make wild predictions, especially if 
they are new (Hong, Kubik, & Solomon, 2000).  As a result, earnings forecasts tend to be 
clustered because analysts make predictions based on what they think others will predict 
(Bajari & Krainer, 2004).  Furthermore, individual analysts report that they often create 
these earnings forecasts after discussing their estimate with company management.  That 
is, analysts who have close relationships with a company will often call up that company 
to check to see if they are “in the ballpark” for the earnings estimate (Reingold, 2006).  
 Ratings also are also ostensibly based on the potential performance of the 
company but may instead be the result of analyst issues.  The rating that an equity analyst 
gives is supposed to be a summary judgment on the equity of the firm.  That is, equities 
expected to perform well in the short term should be rated highly, while those with poor 
performance should receive low ratings.  However, analysts know that both companies 
and investors care a great deal about the ratings of an individual equity.  Companies who 
receive lower than expected ratings usually complain angrily to the equity research group 
that gave the rating.  They retaliate against individual analysts, refusing to talk to them or 
answer their questions.  When the rater is an investment bank, firms will threaten to 
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remove their business (and may in fact remove it).  In at least one case, an analyst was 
fired after a firm complained about its rating (Reingold, 2006; Sieland, 2003).  
Institutional clients may also dislike low ratings.  Institutional investors typically hold 
large blocks of stock and cannot easily sell it.  A lowered rating creates a problem for an 
institutional investor that holds a great deal of the stock.  The investor cannot sell, yet 
questions arise as to why it continues to hold a poor performer.  As a result of these 
pressures, analysts carefully consider what rating they supply.   
 Individual analysts cannot create their own rating systems.  The rating system is 
created by the director of research and other senior staff members.  Although they may 
not create it, all analysts at a brokerage firm use the same rating system.  In the 1990s, 
brokerage firms were able to create whatever rating system they chose.  As a result, 
systems ranged from one category (only equities recommended as a buy) to more than 
twenty separate categories.  The individual categories within classification scheme were 
not specified either.  Some firms focused on ordinal rating systems, dividing their ratings 
into a series of equal intervals.  Other firms created rating systems which were more 
horizontal in nature, dividing positive ratings into multiple categories based on the type 
of stock rather than the expected performance.  And other firms include hybrid types, 
including both horizontal and ordinal ratings. 
 In my sample I include sell-side research only.  Buy-side research is performed by 
private companies and is accessible to the public.  Within sell-side research, I include 
data on independent research firms, broker-dealers, and investment banks.  This is 
important because, as mentioned earlier, each of these types of organizations has different 
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audiences, which I believe to influence the ambiguity of the rating system.  By focusing 
solely on one type of research provider, I would limit the generalizability of my findings. 
 
5.3  Sample 
 My sample is an unbalanced panel of all of the firms based in the United States 
issuing ratings on publicly traded firms in the US that released ratings to IBES/Thomson 
Research between the years 1993 and 2000.  I focus on the years between 1993 and 2000 
partially because of data availability, but also because a series of scandals (several related 
to the collapse of Enron) at high profile investment banks in 2000-2001 roiled the 
industry, resulting in the Global Research Settlement, a set of fines and regulations for 
equity research in general.  Before 2001, brokerage firms were free to use any rating 
system they chose, without explanation.  The new rules allow firms to use any system 
they wish, but the full system must be described and accompanied by written 
explanations on the research report itself.  This may have affected the types of systems 
that firms use.  By restricting my setting to before 2001, I can measure the effect of 
brokerage firms7 acting without restraints from legal regulations directly related to the 
rating system itself.   
 Although my data begin in 1993, there is no indication that left censoring is an 
issue in my analysis.  Left censoring would be a concern to the extent that the factors that 
affect ambiguity prior to 1993 significantly differ from those that affect ambiguity during 
the sample period.  If that is the case, results may be incorrect.  In my specific sample, 
                                                 
7 I use the term “broker-dealer” or “brokerage firm” here for ease of description.  Brokerage implies that a  
firm sells securities.  Technically, this does not describe all of the firms which perform equity research.  
Research-only firms do not sell securities, and investment banks work both as brokerages and also in other 
areas.  However, for the sake of parsimony, and because most people call them brokerages, I use these 
terms. 
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left censoring would be a concern if 1993-2000 represented a unique time in equity 
research.  The close links between equity research and underwriting business began to 
permeate brokerage firms in the late 1980s.  During this time, underwriting activity and 
new issues began to grow, and analysts at some firms began to pay careful attention to 
their firm’s underwriting clients when making their reports (Kessler, 2004; Reingold, 
2006).  By 1990, an article in the Wall Street Journal listed eleven popular category 
labels for stocks, noting that these categories allowed “considerable wiggle room” for 
making recommendations (Schultz, 1990).  What were later described as “excesses” in 
behavior among analysts began to occur in the late 1990s (Kessler, 2004).  Although I 
measure the schemes of the firms beginning in 1993, I was able to capture firm 
underwriting activity and status for the prior 3 years, which means my information about 
the industry begins in 1990.  Thus, beginning my sample in this time actually captures 
brokerage firm activity before the strong push to underwrite permeated almost every firm, 
but still situates it in the middle of a period of common activities for equity research. 
 Focusing on these years yields approximately 1229 observations on 230 broker-
dealers. The firms vary widely in net capital.  In the 1999 data, the largest firm was a 
diversified financial services organization with over $1 billion in assets, while the 
smallest one was an individual research provider with less than $500,000 in assets.  The 
sample includes both public and private firms performing a wide range of services, from 
boutique research firms to full service investment banks.  Although there were over 9515 
broker-dealers registered with the SEC in 1987 alone, this number includes many 
individuals buying or selling stock for a few clients.  In fact, 261 of the firms in the 
industry accounted for nearly 80% of the revenue of the industry (SIA Factbook 2002).  
69 
My sample ranges from large, publicly traded firms to a few private individuals running 
an independent firm, just as in the industry itself.   
 Some large firms have chosen not to reveal their information to Thomson 
Research.  I was able to examine these firms through their public SEC filings, and they 
do not differ in demographic characteristics from the other firms that did choose to 
release their information.  In addition, some of these firms were covered by an alternate 
data source, which allowed me to compare schemes between those that revealed 
information and those that did not.8  The two data sources differed largely by which small 
regional firms they chose to include, although both included many smaller firms. 
 With this original sample, I also gathered customer data information from the SIA 
Industry Yearbook.  Many firms chose not to list information in this directory, or, if they 
did, did not include customer segment data.  The firms that did not release information 
tended to be smaller, regional firms—larger publicly traded firms almost always released 
information.  In general, smaller firms comprise less than 20% of the revenue of the 
industry.  Some smaller firms did release information, and in other aspects, such as status 
or underwriting activity, the non-sharing smaller firms did not appear to be different from 
similar size firms that did share information.  
 
5.4  Variable definitions and Operationalization:  Study 1 
 
                                                 
8 This alternate data source was the original provider of my data.  They pulled my access to the data after a 
major client of theirs expressed concern that the firm was releasing their proprietary information to day 
traders and other subscribers.  This concern is shared by most large firms in the industry; they wish to 
directly reveal their research only to their subscribers, not to the general public or to subscribers of 
“Consensus Ratings” services which combine the ratings of many firms into a single rating.  Thomson is 
one such service. 
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5.4.1  Equation 
 The general form of the equation for predicting the ambiguity score follows the  
 
form:        K              K 
 Prob(y=j)= F(µj-Σßkxk) – F(µj-1-Σßkxk) 
       k=1             k=1 
where j represents the 1 to 7 ambiguity scales, and Σßkxk captures the predictor variables.  
The µ and ß for each equation are computed with an ordered probit function (Liao, 1994). 
 
5.4.2  Detailed Description of Measures 
Dependent Variable  
 The dependent variable of my study is the ambiguity in the rating system.9  This 
is a measure of perception by a potential user or categorizer.  In statistics, ambiguity has 
long been a concern in rating scale construction.  The ability of individuals to discern 
between scaled values varies considerably with the labels that are used.  For example, a 
leading statistical guide suggests that a non-ambiguous rating system should focus on the 
traits of clarity, relevance, precision, variety, and uniqueness(Guilford, 1954).10  Clarity 
                                                 
9 It is important to discuss exactly how I arrived at the classification scheme that was created.  Due to data 
limitations and the withdrawal of data by my original data provider, I was forced to construct the 
classification scheme by observing what the firm actually used.  In some sense, it could be argued that 
focusing on the categories that were used is more appropriate than the categories created, since users only 
see categories that are used, and never see categories that are not used.  However, it is certainly possible 
that categorizers have more categories that they do not use.  In terms of creating a classification scheme, it 
is not clear that the addition of other categories would necessarily clarify categories that were actually used, 
and thus that appear in my scheme.  In fact, it is likely to make the schemes more ambiguous.  The only 
exception to this is firms who used only one category.  On a practical note, dropping these firms from the 
sample does not change the results of any of the hypotheses.  Acquiring data including firm names, 
necessary to match to wider broker characteristics, required signing extraordinarily strict confidentiality 
agreements with two data providers.  While I cannot share direct evidence, I am reasonably confident that 
using the constructed categories does not materially affect my results. 
10 Both authors discuss the importance of objectivity in creating a scale and suggest that rating schemes 
should not place value judgments on the individual categories.  However, the rating scheme here is 
developed precisely to determine value, and thus must be subjective.  Therefore, I leave out this trait as it is 
not relevant to the current study. 
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suggests that the scheme uses “short statements, in simple, unambiguous terminology” 
((Guilford, 1954) p. 293).  Relevance means that each category named should be 
consistent with its future contents (that is, one shouldn’t name a category “bad” if all the 
objects within it are valuable stocks that should be purchased).  Precision suggests that 
the category should refer to a very precise point upon the scale.  Variety means that the 
same words should not be repeated throughout the scheme.  Uniqueness means that the 
category labels should not be general if at all possible (not 
“excellent,” ”superior,” ”average,” “poor”” (Guilford, 1954) p. 293). 
 In my study, ambiguity is something that is created by categorizers that can be 
interpreted in many ways by the users of the scheme.  Since the categorizers are the ones 
who create the scheme, it was important to measure the ambiguity of the scheme using 
their experiences, and not that of users, who might ascribe meaning or perceive clarity in 
a scheme that was designed to be ambiguous.  Therefore, I focused on finding coders 
who had experience in equity research and financial institutions to capture the perspective 
of the categorizer, not the perspective of the users or objects.  I was able to find two 
finance MBA students who had worked for financial institutions in investment banking 
and equity research. 
 To measure the ambiguity of the rating system, I had the two MBA students score 
each rating system on a 1 to 7 scale, with 7 being a completely ambiguous system, while 
1 was a completely unambiguous system.  I gave them specific guidelines about how to 
approach the coding.  After defining ambiguity, and emphasizing that it measured 
overlapping categories and not “good” or “bad” behavior,   I asked them to rate the 
systems given their understanding of the clarity of the language used and their experience 
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in the finance industry.  They were instructed to measure the degree to which they felt a 
single equity could be correctly placed in multiple categories.  The students practiced on 
approximately 20 rating systems, after which we discussed their ratings and clarified any 
questions they had.  The students worked independently to code each of the classification 
schemes in a large subset of the data.  Their intra-class correlation on 618 additional 
schemes was .81, well within the acceptable range.  I then divided the remaining schemes 
between the two of them.  As a result, the dependent variable used in my analysis 
contains ratings from each rater.  Sample rating systems and their coding are listed in 
Appendix A.  Using the MBA students represents a conservative test; having worked in 
the industry they are more likely to be familiar with the terms used, and thus less likely to 
find ambiguity within them. 
 In addition, I also had an untrained undergraduate research assistant code the 
schemes as well.  His intra-class correlation was only .53 with the MBA students.  
However, using his codings versus the codings of the MBA students produced similar 
results.  This suggests to me that the coding scheme is robust. 
 
Independent Variables 
 Conflict of Interest:   Broker-dealers that provide underwriting services face a 
well known conflict of interest.  On the one hand, their duty is to properly describe the 
organizations as they see them through their equity research.  This service is provided for 
the investors, who pay commissions to the broker-dealer to buy and sell securities on 
their behalf. On the other hand, these organizations typically derive a great deal of 
revenue from their underwriting business, and so maintaining strong relationships with 
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underwriting clients (and thus companies covered by equity research) is very important.  
Slighted clients often change underwriters or refuse to give additional business if they 
feel they are presented in an unfavorable light.  Some companies have actively retaliated 
against individual analysts, attempting to get them fired or shutting them out of 
conference calls (Kessler, 2004; Reingold, 2006).  In fact, among the analysts I 
interviewed, dealing with intense and sometimes abusive pressure from the companies 
they covered was a major theme.  The inherent conflict of interest combined with the 
strong pressure of the companies themselves often creates pressure for favorable 
classification (O'Brien et al., 2005; Sieland, 2003).   
 Using SDC’s Venture Xpert, a database of all new issues in the stock market, I 
measured the level of conflict of interest by examining the amount of underwriting 
activity (venture capital and non-venture capital backed IPOs as well as equity issues for 
established organizations) that was issued in the prior year.  I chose the issue date 
because firms often work on underwriting projects for much longer than a single year.  
Projects issued in the prior year may have been started three years before the offering is 
completed.  The first underwriting variable is the raw count of new issues. 
 In addition, I developed a second variable to take into account the level of 
underwriting of a given firm relative to the total possible amount of equities it covered.  
A large brokerage firm underwriting many equities relative to the number it covers faces 
a similar level of conflict of interest as a small firm facing only a few.  I then mean 
centered the variable.  I used the potential for conflict of interest because of the difficulty 
predicting the future performance of a covered equity.  Many equities that have been 
performing well may face a downgrade due to strategic changes or unforeseen 
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macroeconomic events.  Therefore, any underwriting activity by the brokerage firm 
represents a conflict of interest.  I divided the raw conflict variable by the total number of 
equities to get this number.  I then mean centered the variable and shifted it by .2 to 
remove any negative values.  Since the measure of status (see below) contains negative 
values when mean centered, a negative status and negative underwriting variable will 
multiply to be positive, which does not accurately represent the data. 
 Status  I follow Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) and Rao et al (2001) in using 
Institutional Investor magazine’s annual ratings as a measure of status of an individual 
brokerage firm.  Institutional Investor surveys institutional investors to find the best 
individual according to such dimensions as performance and responsiveness.  The actual 
performance accuracy of a particular firm is extremely difficult to calculate for the 
average observer:  each analyst covers between 5 and 20 firms, issuing ratings several 
times each year, and there may be more than 100 analysts in a particular firm.   The top 
three analysts are listed in numerical order and called “All-Star Analysts.”  The II 
Analyst rankings are a good measure of status because they are not perfectly correlated to 
an equity analyst’s performance.  This is evidenced by a comparison of the Institutional 
Investor rankings to performance indicators constructed by Starmine, a company that 
specifically measures the analysts’ accuracy in predicting stock performance.  (Starmine 
ratings only began in 2001, which is too late for my sample.)  The best performing 
companies and analysts frequently differ from the ones listed by Institutional Investor. 
Thus, the II rankings are a measure of perceived quality and prestige.  This was 
confirmed in an interview with the head of an equity research department of a large 
investment bank.  In addition, conversations with industry veterans suggest that analysts 
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themselves lobby for their II rankings, and that they prefer these over other rankings or 
performance metrics that may exist.  Some analysts have been compensated based on 
their II status.  While quality of information may get individual analysts noticed, it is 
extremely rare for new firms to appear on the II magazine rolls.   
 Because status is sticky (Podolny, 1993), I constructed a measure of the brokerage 
firm’s status by counting the total number of Institutional Investor all-star analysts the 
firm had in the prior three years.  I then took the average of this number.  Brokerage 
status is highly skewed, since most brokers have a status of zero.  As a result, following 
Rao et al, I took the log of the averaged status variable.  Using a one year lag rather than 
the average generates similar results.  I then mean-centered the status variable. 
 Status & Conflict:  To create the interaction term in Hypothesis 2, I multiplied the 
status variable with the conflict variable.   
 
Control Variables 
 Path Dependence  It may be that ambiguity is not a conscious choice for a 
brokerage firm, but rather is the result of the firm simply doing what it has always done, 
that is, because of path dependence.  To control for this, I lagged the dependent variable 
(ambiguity measure).  Doing so reduces the sample size by 234 observations. 
 Size  Larger firms may be able to make choices that smaller firms cannot because 
they have more resources.  To the extent that an economic advantage may influence the 
composition of the rating system, I controlled for the size of the firm by using the number 
of analysts the firm employed in a given year.  Because the number was highly skewed, I 
took the natural log.  Using the number of analysts also allowed me to include research-
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only firms, which because they are not brokers, need not publicly file information about 
their finances. 
 Experience  It is possible that newer brokerage firms may choose more 
ambiguous schemes unintentionally because they do not have skill in developing rating 
systems.   I used the firm’s founding date to control for this.  The founding date was 
determined by examining the NASD web site, company web sites, news reports, and SIA 
directories. 
 Total Categories  Ambiguity may increase as the number of categories increases 
because of limits to human processing.  Studies of rating scales indicate, for example, 
that the ability of raters to process the difference between individual categories 
diminishes as the number of categories increases (Guilford, 1954; Spector, 1991).  In 
addition, in the setting of equity research, since there are only three types of ratings, 
positive, neutral, and negative, increasing numbers of categories means increasing 
amounts of categories measuring the same type of rating (i.e. several positive rating 
categories), increasing the likelihood of overlap or confusion.   
 Variability in the firm’s equity coverage  A brokerage firm’s rating system might 
simply be reflecting coverage of a wide range of equities.  If the world of the firm is 
highly ambiguous, then the firm may be unable to clarify it through its rating system.  To 
capture this variability in the equities that a firm covers, I summed the number of 
industries that the firm covered using industry sector data from IBES.  Firms dealing with 
a wide range of industries may create more ambiguous systems than firms that focus on a 
particular industry.   
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 Mean Beta  I included a control to capture the volatility in the brokerage firm’s 
equities.  It may be that firms covering highly volatile industries on average create more 
ambiguous schemes to deal with the volatility.  I used the average beta of the firm’s stock 
portfolio to capture this. 
 Variance of Betas  I also included a measure to capture high variance in the betas 
of the firm’s equity coverage.  This was calculated as the variance of all betas in the 
firm’s stock portfolio.   
 Percentage of Unique Equities  I also created a measure that captured the number 
of unique equities that each firm covered.  Some brokerage firms specialize in covering 
equities that no other firms cover.  This might influence the type of rating system they 
create.  I used the total number of unique equities divided by the total number of equities 
covered to control for this. 
 Workload  The workload of the analysts may have an influence on the type of 
schemes that the company creates.  Covering many stocks requires a large amount of 
work from a single analyst, and it may make them unable to devote enough time to 
carefully analyze each firm.  When equity analysts have many stocks to cover, they may 
need a clearer scheme with fewer rules in order to be able to classify them.  Conversely, 
having many stocks to cover could encourage research departments to create ambiguous 
rating systems if such systems might hide poor performance.  I divided the total number 
of equities by the total number of analysts to determine the average number of equities 
that a given analyst would cover. 
 Amount of Ambiguity of Other Categorizers  Firm decisions may also be 
influenced by the behavior of other firms.  If many other firms have ambiguous 
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classification schemes, a brokerage firm might also choose to have a more ambiguous 
scheme.  I created a lagged measure of the average ambiguity of high status brokerage 
firms, since these firms’ activities are visible to all brokerage firms. 
 Year  I controlled for the year because of the time period of my sample using year 
dummies.  During the late 1990s, a great deal of investment activity and growth occurred, 
which might influence the kinds of schemes being created.   
 
5.4.3  Method 
 Because my dependent variable is an ordinal rating from 1 to 7, with each integer 
representing an increase in value over the last, I used an ordered probit (Long, 1997).  
OLS assumes that the dependent variable can range from positive to negative infinity, 
and is thus an inappropriate method to use.  Ordered probit models estimate the 
probability of an outcome given a set of independent variables and a series of cut points 
(Liao, 1994; Long, 1997).   In addition, ordered probit models assume that the error is 
normally distributed, unlike the ordered logit model, which assumes a logistic 
distribution. 
 In addition, since my sample contains multiple observations per firm, I used 
clustering by firm to deal with the lack of independence between observations.  In 
addition, I used robust standard errors. 
  
5.5  Variable Definitions and Operationalization:  Study 2 
5.5.1  Sample Changes   
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 I started, as before, with the unbalanced panel of all of the firms based in the 
United States issuing ratings on publicly traded firms in the US that released ratings to 
IBES/Thomson Research between the years 1993 and 2000.  To obtain information on 
customer accounts, I used the SIA Industry Directory.   The Securities Industry 
Association is an industry trade group of broker-dealers in the United States.  Many firms 
in the directory are willing to reveal detailed information about their customer accounts, 
offices, and registered representatives (salespeople).  However, not all of the firms in the 
original 230 broker-dealers are listed in the SIA, and, in addition, several of the firms 
who had a directory listing did not reveal detailed information.  As a result, my sample 
decreases to approximately 700 observations on 130 firms.  The remaining 130 firms 
mimic the size distribution of the original sample, with firms ranging from less than $1 
million to over $1 billion in net capital.  The chief difference between the two samples is 
that I lose research-only firms.  These firms are private, and typically serve only 
institutional investors.  Because they do not sell securities, they do not need to file X-
17A-5 forms with the SEC, and most release essentially no information.  While this is not 
ideal, there remain several small firms in the sample that focus only on institutional 
clients.  Although these remaining firms receive revenue from brokerage commissions 
rather than subscription revenue, they have essentially the same goal as the research-only 
firms:  to provide information solely for sophisticated investors.  
 In addition, I also lose many small firms that chose to reveal no information about 
their customer accounts.  Examining the X-17A-5 forms of many of these firms indicates 
that they are similar in net capital, but the forms do not reveal systematic differences 
between the two, and their classification schemes do not appear to be different.  It is 
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possible that these smaller firms may be materially different from those that chose to 
reveal information.  However, in terms of their impact on the industry, they account for 
very little of the overall revenues of brokerage firms. 
 In two instances, large firms that had recently merged did not reveal customer 
account information during the year of the merger, but reappeared in the next year.  I was 
able to measure differences in the classification scheme for these firms during that time, 
and added a dummy variable in general to account for merger activity for this and other 
firms.   
  
5.5.2  Equation 
 The general structure of the equation for the measure of the change of customer 
accounts follows the form 
 yit = α + ßxit + ηi + εit 
 where α is the intercept, ß is the coefficient for the explanatory variables, η 
represents a fixed effect unique to each firm, and ε is the individual error term for 
observation in a given time period. 
 
5.5.3  Measures 
Dependent Variable 
 I wanted to capture the arrival or departure of customers as a way of capturing 
response to the classification scheme.  Revenue measures may be influenced by the 
number of trades given to a single customer.  However, measuring the raw customer 
accounts, rather than the revenue, captures customers choosing or departing from a 
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particular firm.  In addition, many firms in the industry obtain revenue from multiple 
streams, including investment revenue and advising activities.  These numbers are 
typically included in measures of firm revenue.  Focusing on brokerage customer 
accounts allows me to focus on the success of the brokerage portion of the firm’s 
business rather than confounding it with other activities.  Developing an account with a 
particular brokerage firm allows a customer access to the firm’s research, and in some 
cases, to the analysts who provide it.  Thus, increasing numbers of customers represent a 
positive response to the firm’s activities.  Conversely, declining customers send a signal 
to the firm that they are not properly serving these customers.  I measure the change in 
customer accounts as the number of customers of firm j in year t-1 subtracted from the 
number of customer accounts of firm j in year t. 
 
Independent Variables 
 Ambiguity  This is measured as before, using the 2 coders and the 1 to 7 point 
scale.  I lagged this variable. 
 Ambiguity2  I created the quadratic term by multiplying the ambiguity variable 
times itself. 
 Similarity  I measured the similarity of the scheme by calculating the average 
pairwise Jaccard score for each brokerage firm in a given year (Hsu, 2006a; Ruef, 1997).  
Jaccard scores capture the pairwise similarity of objects when not sharing attributes of a 
third object does not mean that the first two are similar to each other.  Jaccard scores are 
measured as intersection over union of a given set of words.  For example, the Jaccard 
score of two schemes, “Buy, Hold, Sell” and “Strong Buy, Buy, Sell” is 2/4.  A detailed 
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description, including a visual representation, is included in Appendix B.  For each 
brokerage firm in a given year, I first calculated the pairwise score for each firm relative 
to all others in the same year.  I then averaged these scores together to get a firm’s total 
average pairwise similarity.  This measure captures the extent to which the scheme uses 
similar categories as all other schemes in the marketplace. 
 Strategic Change  This variable was created by interacting the variable New with 
the change in similarity variable (both detailed below), to capture the increase or decrease 
in similarity of a new scheme relative to other schemes. 
New  This variable is coded 1 if the categories used by the firm in a given year are 
different than the combination of categories used by the firm in the prior year. 
Change in similarity  I measured this as the difference in the average pairwise 
similarity of the firm in a given year versus its average pairwise similarity in the 
prior year. 
 Legitimacy  The extent to which a scheme is widely used by other brokerage 
firms measures how widely accepted the scheme is.  Widely used schemes are often 
considered industry standards, and may be the first choice for new entrants.  In addition, 
schemes used by many firms means that many customers are experienced with such 
schemes.  I measured the frequency of usage of the scheme by counting the number of 
firms that used the exact scheme as the focal firm.  I lagged this variable. 
 Quality  I used the Wall Street Journal’s analyst ratings to determine the quality of 
the brokerage firm, that is, how well they used the scheme and analysts that they had.  
The Wall Street Journal, during the period from 1992 to 2000, used both forecast 
accuracy and stock picking accuracy to determine the best performing brokerage firms.  I 
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used the total number of Wall Street Journal ranked analysts that the firm had in the prior 
year to measure the firm’s quality in the prior year.  Because this number is highly 
skewed, I took the natural log. 
 This measure differs from the status measure described earlier and used as a 
control because it specifically measures performance.11  As a result, many firms with 
strong analyst performance make the WSJ list but do not make the list of Institutional 
Investor magazine, which is created by survey and seen as a popularity contest by 
analysts in the industry.  In conversations with analysts and investment bankers, the WSJ 
rankings rarely came up, but the II ones routinely were mentioned.  As expected by 
theory, status and quality are highly correlated, but not excessively so. 
 Legitimacy*Quality  To measure the extent to which customer migrate to high 





 Age  Newer firms may lack experience, and as a result, may gain or lose large 
amounts of customers.  As a result, I controlled for firm age.  I used the founding date of 
the firm.   
 Coverage  The number of industries that a firm covers may affect its classification 
scheme.  Firms covering large numbers of firms may change their schemes more 
                                                 
11 Measurement varied by year, but for most years, the top stock picks of individual analysts were included 
and checked for accuracy.  For some years, firms were graded by an examination of all of their top stock 
picks, which were then sorted into individual analyst performance.  Either method would create slightly 
different results, but in the end, the choices and forecasts of the analysts was the basis for their ranking, 
rather than the response or nomination by institutional investors. 
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frequently because they need a scheme that allows them to deal with multiple industries.  
I used the sum of the industries to control for this.   
 Workload  I calculated the average number of stocks covered by the analysts at 
the firm by dividing the total number of equities covered by the total number of reporting 
analysts at the firm.  To the extent that the workload of an individual analyst might 
impact the quality of the research, and thus the customer response, controlling for 
workload is important. 
 Underwriting  Underwriting activity may encourage new customer accounts as 
firms wanting underwriting services choose a single brokerage firm to handle multiple 
accounts.  I used the total amount of underwriting issues for the firm in the prior year.   
 I also included a measure to account for the percentage of underwriting of the 
firm in a given year, calculated as the total amount of underwriting divided by the total 
number of equities covered. 
 
 Focus  Institutional investors and retail investors may have different preferences 
and may act differently in choosing a brokerage firm.  As a result, I controlled for the 
firm’s client focus.  I created a dummy variable.  Institutional Investors was coded 1 if 
more than 75% of the firm’s registered representatives (salespeople) were institutional 
focused.   
 Status  I used the same status measure as in the prior section. 
 Change in quality  Customers may flock to firms that have increased their abilities 
in stock picking and earnings forecasts.  Conversely, customers may leave firms who 
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decline in these areas.  To control for this, I used the difference in quality between time 1 
and time 0. 
Controls related to the classification scheme 
 Total Categories  Research on human processing shows that humans have 
difficulty distinguishing between categories as the amount of them increases.  Firms with 
higher numbers of categories may cause customers to leave because customers do not 
understand the schemes.  I used the sum of the number of categories to control for the 
size of the classification scheme. 
 Frequency of changes  Frequently changing schemes may confuse customers, 
causing them to leave.  Thus, for each firm-year, I counted the total number of changes 
that had occurred in the prior years of the sample.  This number was set to zero the first 
year of the sample. 
 Length of time of prior scheme  Customers may prefer firms with stable 
classification schemes.  To control for this, I included a variable to take into account the 
length of time the prior year’s scheme had lasted.   
 
5.5.4  Method   
 My dependent variable measures change, and can theoretically range from 
negative to positive infinity.  Although some economists argue that mathematically, an 
equation with change as the dependent variable should also only contain variables 
measuring change in the independent variables, others argue that, based on theoretical 
predictions, predicting change through levels rather than change is acceptable (Allison, 
1990).  Allison (1990) further notes that, in cases where change is the dependent variable, 
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the lagged term should not be included in the equation because it is captured in the 
dependent variable.  Because firms appear in multiple years, my data are not independent 
across observations.  I fit both ordinary least squares with firm clustering and fixed 
effects models.  Because fixed effects models separate variance across firms and within 
the same firm, I focus on these results in my discussion. 
 
5.6  Data Sources 
 My data come from several sources.  A summary of the data sources is listed in 
Appendix C.  I received information on the rating systems from IBES/Thomson using the 
btext field of the broker recommendations file.  IBES also was the source of the industry 
coverage data and information on the analysts.  Information about the financial details, 
size, age, and customer makeup were determined by examining the directories of the 
Securities Industry Association Yearbook.  It was confirmed, when possible, through X-
17A-5 statements, a brokerage firm annual report that contains balance sheet information 
on all registered broker-dealers in the United States, required by the SEC.  I also used the 
NASD online broker history and web sources to confirm founding dates and headquarters 
location.  Information about the underwriting activity of a brokerage firm was gathered 
using SDC  Platinum.  Information about the brokerage firm’s coverage universe was 
collected from IBES (Thomson Financial) and linked to CRSP data using firm CUSIPs 
(for equities covered by a given brokerage firm) to get information on firm betas.  This 
data was also used to get the percentage of unique stocks covered by individual brokerage 
firms. 
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 In addition to the archival data I gathered, I also conducted informal interviews 
with a dozen individuals who worked in a variety of roles in the brokerage industry.  
Included in the group was the head of the legal department of a large investment bank, 
Institutional Investor ranked analysts, the head of a research department of a major 
financial institution, investment bankers, and two institutional investors.  The interviews 
lasted between fifteen minutes to over an hour and a half.  Interviewees were asked open 
ended questions about their experience in the industry as well as the history and evolution 





CHAPTER 6  
RESULTS 
 
 This chapter presents the results of the hypotheses discussed in chapters 3 and 4.  
Given the two dependent variables, ambiguity and performance, I will discuss each 
separately for ease of communication.   
 
6.1  Descriptive Statistics, Ambiguity 
 The data collection resulted in 1229 observations on 230 brokerage firms.  The 
average length of time in the sample was approximately 4 years.  The mean ambiguity of 
the firms in each year are summarized in Figure 6.1.  In general, ambiguity is increasing 
during the time period of the sample, starting at an average of 3.59 in 1993 to a high of 
4.497 in 2000.  Underwriting levels are summarized in Figure 6.2.  The amount of 
underwriting activity (new issues) of the firms in the sample increases over time, peaking 
in 1998, and then falling in 1999, but climbing again in 2000.  This is similar to the 
maximum levels of underwriting.  The highest amount of underwriting by a single firm 
was 490 new issues in 1998. 
 Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for the data.  The use of 
the lagged dependent variable resulted in the loss of 243 observations from the 1229 in 
the original sample.  Several variables are worth noting.  The average ambiguity score in 
the sample is 4.077, with a standard deviation of 1.7.  The average number of categories 
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is 3.699; with a maximum of sixteen unique categories.  The average amount of 
underwriting is approximately 32 new issues, with a maximum of 423.  The mean of the  
status variable is zero.  This variable was mean-centered.  Since the vast majority of firms 
have a status score of zero, mean centering the data lowered the value of the mean and 
created negative values for status for many firms.   
 Most of the correlations presented in Table 6.1 are unremarkable.  Not 
surprisingly, the lagged dependent variable is highly correlated with the dependent 
variable.  Other variables are not highly correlated with the dependent variable.  A few 
variables are highly correlated.  Various rules of thumb suggest there is a concern for 
multicollinearity when correlations are high.  Different sources suggest levels ranging .6 
from .75.  First, size and coverage are correlated at .77.  This suggests possible 
multicollinearity.  Both variables are controls.  Transforming the variables reduces this 
correlation, but does not substantively change the results.  Neither does removing either 
variable.  Therefore, I leave both variables in the equation.  Not surprisingly, 
underwriting is correlated with size at a level of .61.  Again, transformations reduce this 
correlation, but do not alter the results.  For ease of interpretation, I use the raw 
underwriting numbers.  Similarly, status is highly correlated with size, but has little effect 
on the results. 
 More concerning is the relatively high correlation between status and 
underwriting.  Various rules of thumb suggest there is a concern for multicollinearity 
when correlations are high.  Different sources suggest levels ranging .6 or .75.  At .54 it is 
high.  Again, I used transformations on both of these variables in an attempt to reduce the 
correlation.  Doing so reduced the correlation to .48, but did not alter the results.  The 
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correlations between the interactions are also high.  Much of this is due to the fact that the 
vast majority of observations for status are zero.  Ideally, this measure should be 
expanded to include more information about status across all firms.  Doing so would 
require collecting more data which is not clearly available for the time period under 
examination.  It also suggests that an additional way to capture the status of a firm may 
be to use an indicator variable suggesting high status or no status.   The results of this are 
discussed below. 
 
6.2  Results, Dependent Variable Ambiguity 
 The results of the models are presented in Table 6.2.  Several control variables are 
worth discussing.  First, the lagged dependent variable is significant and positive, 
suggesting that prior ambiguous classification schemes increases the probability of an 
ambiguous classification scheme in the current period.  Total categories is also positive 
and significant.  Size, however, is negative and significant.  Relative ambiguity is 
positive and significant, suggesting increasing probabilities of ambiguous classification 
schemes as other firms have ambiguous schemes as well.  In several of the models, the 
variance of the beta score is significant and positive, suggesting that firms covering a 
wide variety of industries (firms that cover equities with widely different betas) have 
higher probabilities of ambiguous schemes than others. 
 Hypothesis one suggested that high levels of underwriting activity would lead to 
increased ambiguity in the classification scheme.  This hypothesis is supported using the 
raw count of underwriting activity.  The standardized coefficient (bStdX) for 
underwriting is .1333, suggesting that an increase of one standard deviation in the amount 
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of underwriting increases the probability by .1333.  I also graphed the range of 
probabilities for values of underwriting activity in Figure 6.3.  The effects are quite 
striking.  As underwriting activity increases, the probability of receiving a 1, 2, 3, or 4 
rating declines, while the probability of receiving a 5, 6, or 7 increases.  The 
measurement of underwriting activity using a percentage measurement is not significant. 
 Hypothesis two suggested that the interaction between status and underwriting 
was positive.  The interaction is significant at the .10 level using the raw count of 
underwriting and is significant at the .01 level using the percentage measurement.  
However, interpreting the coefficient of an interaction effect in an ordered probit cannot 
be reliably done using significance levels (Ai & Norton, 2002).  Instead, a graphical 
approach is better.  The method suggested by Ai and Norton, using the inteff command in 
STATA, does not support clustering in the data.  As a result, I offer two alternatives.  
First, I show a graphical version of all predicted probabilities.  In Figure 6.4, the 
predicted probabilities as the interaction between status and underwriting increases from -
135, the lowest value, representing a firm with no status and no underwriting, to 1250, 
representing a high status firm with high levels of underwriting.  The probabilities are 
vastly different.  For the no status/no underwriting firm, the probability of having a rating 
system rated a 6 is approximately .11, while it is close to .37 for a high status firm with 
high levels of underwriting.  The probability of a no status/no underwriting firm of 
having a rating system coded as a 7 is close to zero, while it is .10 for a high status firm 
with high levels of underwriting.  In Figure 6.5, I graph the probabilities for the ratio of 
underwriting.  The probabilities look similar.  (The graph in 6.5 is misleading because 
there are only two values less than -1 in the data.  Removing these outliers does not affect 
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the results of the hypotheses.) In addition, in Table 6.3, I show the results of using 
ordinary least squares to predict the level of ambiguity.  Using OLS is technically 
incorrect, as the assumptions of OLS require that the dependent variable range from 
negative to positive infinity.  Clearly, the 1 to 7 levels of ambiguity do not fit this 
assumption, and so predictions using OLS may not be in the range of the data.  However, 
interaction effects in OLS are easily interpretable.  I divided the variable conprior by 100 
to make the coefficient clearer.  The interaction is significant at the .05 level (one-tailed 
test).  The effect is significant and positive.  It suggests that given a one unit change in 
the status variable, the slope of the dependent variable is predicted to increase by 0.0813.  
Stated another way, when status is zero, the effect of underwriting on ambiguity is 0.035 
(Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003).   
 Using OLS also has the benefit of being able to use variance inflation factors to 
examine multicollinearity.  The VIFs for the variables of concern, status, underwriting, 
and size.  The VIF for size is high, at 5.16.  Removing it from the equation decreases the 
p-value of the interaction, but does not change the direction of the effect.  I also 
substituted a variable for registered representatives (salespeople) to capture size.  Doing 
so drastically reduced the number of observations, since registered representative data 
was not available for many firms.  This substitution decreased the correlations, and 
increased the p-value of the interaction. 
 In addition, I created a dummy variable for status, coded as 1 if the firm had been 
ranked by Institutional Investor magazine, and 0 otherwise.  Using this measure rather 
than the raw status score in the interaction does not significantly alter the p-value of the 
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interaction, but it does reduce the high correlation between the main effect for status and 
the interaction. 
 I did a series of additional analyses to examine the robustness of my results.  In 
equity research, other researchers have suggested the presence of a U shaped curve 
between status and ratings (Phillips et al., 2001).  While I gave a rationale for why I felt a 
U shaped relationship between status and ambiguity was unlikely, I nonetheless tested for 
such a relationship.  This effect was not significant.  I also created a quadratic term for 
underwriting; it was not significant. 
 I reran the models using ordered logit specifications rather than ordered probit.  
The results remained the same.   There were a few firms which had relatively high ratios 
of underwriting to equities covered.  I removed these firms from the sample.  When this 
occurs, the potential underwriting variable loses significance, but the raw measure of total 
underwriting maintains its significance. 
 To create my dependent variable, I used a mix of the ratings from both MBA 
coders.  In addition, I had both MBA coders code the entire dataset and reran the models 
using each coder separately, getting similar results to using the mixed dependent variable.   
I also wanted to see if financial background affected the ambiguity score given to the 
rating systems.  An undergraduate with no financial expertise also coded the rating 
systems after being given guidelines about what constituted an ambiguous classification 
scheme.  His inter-rater reliability with the combined skilled coders’ ratings was much 
lower, only .51.  Careful inspection of the data indicated agreement between all three 
coders at the extremes of the rating system; however, the middle ratings differed between 
the unskilled and skilled coders.  The coefficients from an ordered probit using the 
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unskilled coder are in the same direction as those of the skilled coders, although weaker.   
In addition, I created a variable that used only the lowest ambiguity measure of all raters.  
I also averaged the scores of all coders together and ran both a tobit model and OLS.  The 
results were robust to all specifications. 
 Concerned that my definition of ambiguity might be biased in favor of finding 
ambiguity, I also recoded the dependent variable to consider the possibility that some 
classification schemes were nuanced, rather than ambiguous.  For example, some rating 
systems include five balanced categories, two positive, one neutral, and two negative.  
Most raters gave such a scheme an ambiguity score of 3.  However, for some, this might 
be seen as a very nuanced world, rather than a slightly ambiguous one.  I added an 
additional variable that counted the total number of expanded categories that the scheme 
used.  For example, a scheme that included “strong buy, buy, speculative buy, hold, sell” 
would be coded ‘2’ for the two expanded categories (strong buy and speculative buy) that 
could be providing nuance to the classification scheme.  My results were robust to this 
additional variable.  I also added a variable measuring whether the scheme was vertical or 
not.  A vertical scheme involves an implicit order from best to worst.  This variable was 
strongly significant and negative, suggesting that vertical schemes were rated as less 
ambiguous than other schemes.  When this variable was added, alone or in combination 
with the expanded categories variable, the results remained robust.  
 In addition, the graphs suggested that there might be a difference between 
ambiguity ratings of 5, 6, or 7 versus ratings of 1, 2, 3, or 4.  Thus, I considered the 
possibility that ambiguity acts in a dichotomous fashion, rather than on a continuum.  I 
recoded all schemes rated 4 or below as a zero, for unambiguous, and all schemes greater 
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than or equal to 5 as a 1, or ambiguous.  I then reran the models using a probit model.  
The results are slightly less significant but the coefficients are very similar.     
 In addition, there is a potential concern of simultaneity bias with the total 
categories variable.  Total categories may be determined in tandem with the ambiguity of 
the classification scheme.  In such a case, it may not be appropriate to treat the two as 
independent.  I made several attempts to deal with this.  First, I lagged the total categories 
variable and reran the models.  The results are slightly less significant, but the 
coefficients are similar.  Next, I used the total categories variable as the dependent 
variable instead of ambiguity.  None of the hypothesized effects were significant; 
however, the measures for size and relative ambiguity were significant.12   
 In sum, the models presented above are robust to multiple alternative 
specifications, both in terms of choices with made with the dependent variable as well as 
the form of the interaction. 
                                                 
12  I did also experiment  with simultaneous equations (Three stage least squares, or 3SLS) in an attempt to 
deal with the potential for simultaneity bias.  Statistical techniques for using simultaneous equations with 
limited dependent variables, such as the ambiguity rating scale, do not currently exist.  Therefore, I was 
forced to make an assumption that the dependent variable ranged between negative and positive infinity.  
3SLS is useful when the number of equations matches the number of endogenous or simultaneous variables.  
This fits the case here because there are two equations, and total categories and ambiguity are the two 
variables in question.  I specified two equations:  I used lagged total categories and all other variables to 
predict total categories.  I then used all variables except for lagged total categories to predict ambiguity.  
The coefficients and significance levels remained similar for the ambiguity equation.  This method cannot 
be seen as a reliable examination due to the limitations of my dependent variable, but does offer some 
evidence that the original model is robust to alternative specifications. 
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6.3  Descriptive Statistics, Performance 
 The sample size for the final four hypotheses is reduced from the sample for the 
first set of hypotheses.  This occurs for several reasons.  First, using fixed effects requires 
at least two observations per firm.  Firms with only one observation were dropped.  In 
addition, information on customer accounts was available only for the subset of firms that 
released information in their profile in the SIA directory.  Thus, the model contains 520 
observations for which data was available. 
 The descriptive statistics for the performance variables as well as the correlations 
are presented in Table 6.4.  A few variables are worth further discussion.  The average 
similarity of classification scheme is .439, with a low value of .415 in 1998 and a high 
of .46 in 1994.  Thus, the level of similarity is generally stable over the time period.  
However, despite this similarity, there is a high level of change in the system.  The mean 
for new schemes is .582, suggesting that a firm uses a new combination of categories 
than in the prior year 58% of the time.   The average scheme is shared by only 3.3 other 
categorizers.  Thus, the market for brokerage rating systems is extremely dynamic during 
this time. 
 In the correlations, a few variables raise the concern for multicollinearity.  Size is 
highly correlated with a number of variables, including total categories, status, quality, 
and the frequency*quality interaction.  Removing it from the models does not affect the 
results of the hypotheses.  Substituting other size measures, such as total salespeople, 
does not change the results. 
 Of greater concern is the high correlation between the components of the strategic 
change variable of .90.  To address this issue, I mean centered the similarity variable.  
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This barely reduced the correlation; other transformations were equally unsuccessful.  All 
results were unaffected.  Examining the variance inflation factors on the correlation data, 
using a cutoff of 5 reveals that the interaction term and change in similarity variable for 
the main effect have a VIF of 6.03 and 5.68, repectively.  The high correlation and high 
VIF for this variable is not unexpected because of the nature of the way the variable is 
constructed.  Since the interaction term is a difference variable interacted with a binary 
variable which represents almost a perfect split in the data, the resulting data will closely 
follow the original variables.  In this case, the interaction has the effect of changing all of 
the difference scores to zero for firms that did not change their schemes, while the values 
for firms that did change their schemes are unchanged.   
 
6.4  Results, Dependent Variable Performance 
 Table 6.5 captures the results of a fixed effects regression using the dependent 
variable change in customer accounts.  Model 1 shows the results of the control variables.  
Models 2 through 8 show the results of the hypothesized variables.   
 In general, several control variables are worth discussing.  First, having a retail 
focus appears to increase the number of customer accounts that a firm has.  This is not 
surprising; retail-focused firms may have more customers simply because each individual 
customer has a lower account volume than an institutional investor.  Thus, more retail 
customers are needed to achieve revenues for a firm.  Next, underwriting activity also 
significantly influences change in customer accounts:  the more underwriting of new 
issues that a firm does, the greater the change in customers accounts.  However, the 
relative volume of underwriting activity to coverage did not seem to affect the dependent 
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variable.  Interestingly, quality appears to have a negative affect on customer accounts, 
although it is not significant.  Worried that this might be due to any correlation with 
status, I removed the status variable from the equation.  The quality variable remained 
negative.  Merger and takeover activity did not have a statistically significant affect on 
customer accounts, suggesting that joining two firms was not a significant driver of a 
change in customer accounts.  Also, size has a negative effect on the change in customer 
accounts, but this effect is not significant.   
 Hypothesis three suggested that ambiguity followed an inverted U shape.  The 
main effect of ambiguity is shown in Model 2 of Table 6.5  It is positive, though not 
significant on its own.  The U-shaped hypothesis is supported in models 3 and 8.  In both 
models, the main effect is positive, while the squared term is negative, suggesting a U 
shaped relationship.  The squared term is significant at the .10 level in model 3 of Table 
6.5, while the main effect is not significant.  In model 8, both main effect and squared 
term are significant at the .05 level.  The inflection point is graphed in Figure 6.6.  This 
shows that having a scheme rated a 1 or a 7 attracted fewer customers than having a 
scheme rated 4 or 5.  Given that the mean of the ambiguity scores is close to 4, this 
suggests that firms with an average level of ambiguity relative to others do better than 
firms adopting an extreme position.  In real numbers, this suggests that firms choosing a 
scheme that is rated a 1 gain approximately 12,234 customers, holding all other variables 
constant.  Firms choosing a 4-rated scheme have a change in customers of 30,312, 
holding all other variables constant.  Firms with a highly ambiguous scheme (rated a 7) 
have an increase of 20,454 customers, holding all other variables constant.   
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 Hypothesis four suggested that firms that chose to change their scheme to be more 
similar to others would do poorly compared to those that did not.  Model 4 of Table 6.5 
shows the main effects without the interaction.  The coefficient for new schemes is 
significant and negative, suggesting that having a new scheme reduces the number of 
customer accounts.  The coefficient for change in similarity is positive and significant, 
suggesting that changes in a firm’s similarity score increase the number of customer 
accounts.  This does not mean that action by the firm necessarily drives these increases, 
since similarity can change either by the firm’s own actions or by the actions of other 
firms.  The interaction effect distinguishes between the two.  
 Hypothesis four predicted a negative coefficient for the interaction.  This 
hypothesis is supported in models 5 and 8 of Table 6.5.  In model 5, the interaction is 
significant and negative at the .01 level, and remains so in model 8.  In numerical terms, 
the effect of a 1 unit increase in the change of similarity when the scheme is not new is 
178,322 customer accounts.  However, it is important to note that the similarity variable, 
as measured by the Jaccard score, varies between zero and 1.  A value of one is extremely 
unlikely, particularly as the number of firms in a given years increases.  In general, the 
interpretation of the interaction effect is difficult to conceptualize, and so the graph in 
Figure 6.8 shows the interaction in detail.  One line represent a change in similarity when 
a firm has also changed its scheme (where New = 1 and change in similarity is calculated 
as Similarityt- Similarityt-1), suggesting a strategic change.  The other represents a change 
in similarity caused by the changes of other firms (where New = 0 rather than 1).  
Examining the line for strategic change reveals that firms that changed their schemes to 
become much more similar to other schemes lost customers, as evidenced by the negative 
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slope of the line.  However, firms that changed to new schemes from the ones they had 
before that were highly dissimilar to other firms actually gained customers, as evidenced 
by the positive values of customer accounts at low levels of similarity.  Implementing 
such a strategy would be difficult:  a firm must not only change its scheme, but must also 
rely on other firms not changing their schemes in a similar way.  This suggests that 
strategic change in general does not yield benefits to firms.   
 Examining the line for changes in similarity due to changes in other firms (where 
New = 0) reveals an opposite effect.  Firms that did not change their schemes, but instead 
became more similar due to the scheme choices of others, often gained customers, as 
shown by the positive slope of the line.  At the extreme, however, as a brokerage firm’s 
similarity changed drastically as a result of the actions of other firms, the actual level of 
customer accounts is negative.   
 Hypothesis five suggested that using a frequently used scheme increases customer 
accounts.  The effect of the variable for frequency is positive and significant in Model 6 
in Table 6.5, giving support to hypothesis five.  An additional firm using the same 
scheme as the focal firm increases the focal firm’s customer accounts by approximately 
1300.   
 Hypothesis six suggested that this effect would be increased as the firm’s quality 
increased.  The effect of the interaction between quality and frequency is positive and 
significant at the .01 level in both models 7 and 8 in Table 6.5.  When quality is zero, 
using a frequently used scheme gains a firm 2419 customer accounts.  Or, conversely, 
when no other firms have the same scheme, being high quality loses a firm 12064 
customer accounts.  A graph of the interaction effect is in Figure 6.7.  The table shows 
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the change in customer accounts at low levels of quality, at mean quality, and at high 
quality for differing frequencies.  While all firms benefit from using a scheme that 
matches others, high quality firms have the most to gain from using the same scheme as 
other firms.  In fact, high quality firms appear to suffer when they use a scheme that no 
one else uses.   
 It is important to discuss the implications of Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 in the industry 
context.  Overall, the results suggest that the industry operates in niches of different 
schemes.  Hypothesis four argues that becoming more similar to other firms lowers the 
change in customer accounts.  A scheme that is similar to all other schemes is likely to 
have categories that match the two dominant paradigms of schemes, categories of action 
and categories of description.  All schemes with high similarity scores included at least 
one category of each.  On the other hand, a frequently used scheme is not necessarily 
highly similar to many other schemes.  The most frequently used schemes (Buy, hold, 
sell; strong buy, buy, hold, sell) were consistent in their categories of action.  Thus, 
though these schemes were identical to each other, they were not similar across all other 
firms.   
 I used several alternative specifications to check the robustness of my results.  My 
dependent variable is a change score.  I also ran models predicting the raw customer 
accounts variable, using a lagged customer accounts variable as a control.  The results 
remained similar.  In addition, I ran the models using ordinary least squares and 
clustering rather than using the fixed effects models.  Clustering does not allow 
distinctions of within versus across firm variance.  All of the hypothesized results 
remained significant.  The only change of note was in the raw similarity variable, which 
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became positive and insignificant.  In general, this points to an opportunity for further 







 This dissertation makes contributions in several areas.  It extends the literature on 
classification by highlighting the role of the categorizer in the resultant schemes that are 
created.  It also brings into focus competition among categorizers, showing how 
competition shapes categorizer performance.  This dissertation had two aims:  first, to 
provide an alternative explanation for why classification schemes are created, and second, 
to show that classification schemes have a material impact for those who create them.   
I shall discuss each in turn. 
 
7.1  Contributions to Theory on Classification 
 I first argued that classification schemes may be created for other purposes rather 
than traditionally argued clarity purposes.  Certainly other authors have pointed out that 
classification systems are used in ways that benefit those that create them (Bowker et al., 
2000; Douglas, 1986; Douglas et al., 1992).  This is evident in racial classification, for 
example, where distinctions are drawn between different races in order to privilege one 
race above another, and in art, where elites create divisions of art in order to dominate 
cultural resources (Bowker et al., 2000; DiMaggio, 1987).  This chapter argues for a 
slightly different possibility.  Rather than suggesting that it is through control of sharp 
boundaries across categories that powerful actors exert control, I suggested that elites can 
reap benefits from creating weak or overlapping boundaries—that is, through creating 
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ambiguous classification schemes.  This is possible because of how users perceive both 
ambiguity and categorizers.  Humans are predisposed to try to make sense of ambiguous 
encounters (DiMaggio, 1997).  As a result, they may perceive an ambiguous system but 
will attempt to develop an interpretation of it that makes sense to them.   
 While the predisposition of users to attempt to interpret ambiguity in a favorable 
way may make it seem like something that many categorizers would choose, in fact not 
all of them do.  Favorable incentives, such as a conflict of interest, which may make an 
ambiguous classification system extremely lucrative, may result in the creation of such a 
scheme.  However, those most likely to create ambiguous classification schemes are 
those with both the incentive to do so and the influential social position to buffer their 
choices.   Such firms can create ambiguous systems because users appreciate the status of 
the categorizer even if they do not completely understand what it is that the categorizer 
does.   Since actors in general like to be affiliated with higher status others, users may be 
willing to remain with them simply for the affiliation.  Furthermore, the categorizers’ 
powerful market position gives them the resources to withstand any negative 
repercussions of such activity.  Having an ambiguous classification scheme benefits these 
categorizers because it allows them to have several options for classifying a particular 
object. 
 Having established that classification schemes are strategically created in certain 
circumstances, I then turned to examine the implication of these classification schemes 
on firm performance.  Prior research has frequently argued the benefits of classification 
for categorized objects, highlighting the importance of category placement (Ruef et al., 
2007; Zuckerman, 1999).  Yet the impact for the categorizer of the choice of a particular 
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scheme had not been examined.   The choice of the classification scheme matters in a 
tangible way to categorizers—both in terms of which categories are chosen, but also in 
terms of how the categorizer positions its scheme relative to others.  My findings bring 
into focus the competition among categorizers, pointing out that this may shape the kinds 
of classification schemes used.  Classification schemes rarely exist in isolation:  
restaurant guides, product guides, rating systems and directories abound.  Categorizers 
can compete on at least three dimensions:  placement of objects, information shared, or 
the configuration of the scheme.  When categorizers are mentioned in the press and in 
research, the focus has generally been contained to descriptive differences about the first 
two dimensions.  I show that the third dimension deserves attention as well. 
 Ambiguity captures the relationships of categories within a single scheme.  My 
results suggest that while categorizers may choose ambiguity as a strategy for their own 
benefits, it works to a point.  Too much ambiguity results in fewer customers than those 
who choose moderate levels.  Too little ambiguity also results in fewer customers.  This 
may be due to the fact that uncertain markets are difficult to clearly categorize in the first 
place; focusing on clarity may constrain the ability to use the scheme. 
 The relationship of categories within the scheme is not the only determinant of 
firm performance.  I showed that frequency also played a role.  Categorizers who chose 
the exact same scheme benefited from doing so.  However, they gained the most 
customers when they were also higher in quality, measured as their ability to use the 
scheme.  This is because choosing the same scheme shifts the locus of competition from 
type of scheme to use of the scheme. 
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 Finally, I examined how changes in the similarity of the categorizer’s 
classification scheme relative to others affected the resultant customer accounts.  
Categorizers that changed their scheme to be more similar to other categorizers declined 
in performance, while categorizers who had others move to be more similar in their 
scheme increased their performance.   
 Overall, the second part of the dissertation suggests that meaning creation is a 
competitive behavior, not just an act of comprehension.  Categorizers jockey for position 
by carefully choosing and shifting the categories they use; this has implications for their 
performance, but also broadly for understanding of the categories.  Increased usage of 
categories increases performance, but it also pushes toward standardization of meaning, 
as more and more firms share similar schemes. 
 In addition, this dissertation points to the need to consider the classification 
scheme in its entirety.  Prior research has highlighted actions within a single category, 
such as survival, identity formation, and success (Kennedy, 2005; Rao et al., 2005; Ruef 
et al., 2007; Zuckerman, 1999; Zuckerman et al., 2003a).  This dissertation complements 
a focus on individual categories by juxtaposing different categories within a scheme 
against each other and across different categorizers.   As a result, it adds to a growing 
body of research considering multiple classification schemes (Benjamin et al., 1999; Rao 
et al., 2007).   Prior authors have examined whether the coverage decisions and resultant 
ratings have converged across multiple schemes.  They have often faced the task of 
attempting to make different classification systems commensurable.   I examined why 
these systems might be similar or different in the first place.  I suggested that it is not 
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simply an empirical difficulty that multiple systems differ; rather, these systems are 
carefully designed.   
 
7.2  Implications for Strategy  
 Overall, this dissertation argues that cultural aspects shape and inform firm 
strategy and vice versa.  I first argued that strategic action shapes the creation of 
classification schemes.  Before, strategic action had been largely examined in the 
maintenance and use of classification schemes.  The creation of a classification scheme is 
an attempt to create meaning out of a set of objects and is thus a profoundly cultural act.  
Categorizers add the element of strategy to this act.  Yet classification schemes also 
impact performance.  It is well established that classification schemes convey information 
and shape markets; I argued that they also have an impact on categorizer (and thus firm) 
performance.  
 
7.3  Directions for Future Research 
 In this dissertation, I highlighted the role of the categorizer in scheme creation.  
Further research on categorizer choices abound.  For example, mergers among 
categorizers require the creation of a single system for the combined company.  
Researchers could examine whether a particular scheme dominates, or whether schemes 
are blended together.  New entrants also face the choice of creating a scheme.  
Investigations into their choices may uncover new insights into how competition shapes 
classification. 
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 In addition, there are opportunities to examine how classification schemes do or 
do not converge over time.  In my particular setting, schemes diverged until a rule change 
by the SEC required full disclosure of the classification scheme, at which point most 
firms adopted the same, three part scheme.  Legal requirements certainly shape scheme 
convergence, but other factors may also contribute to the proliferation of unique schemes, 
or, conversely, the convergence of schemes to a few recognizable types. 
 Finally, I considered the schemes in absence of the categorized objects.  Yet the 
choice of the scheme obviously has an impact on what is categorized and how.  How 































A Series of “Chairs” Assembled through Prototypical Association 
 
 






                                                 
13 In order of appearance, the chairs are:  Restaurant Chair #26, Hotel Banquet Chair (www.restaurant-
services.com); Chair, 1890 (pencil) by Vincent Van Gogh (www.vangoghgallery.com); Alphabet Chair, 
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Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
 Mean S.D. Min Max Ambiguity Lagged 
Ambiguity 
Total Categ. Experience Workload Size Coverage 
Ambiguity 
 
    4.077     1.764     1.000     7.000 1.00       
Lagged Ambiguity 
 
    3.974     1.796     1.000     7.000 0.68 1.00      
Total Categories 
 
    3.699     1.680     1.000    16.000 0.19 0.23 1.00     
Experience 
 
 1950.090    43.776  1799.000  1998.000 0.06 0.06 -0.32 1.00    
Workload 
 
   11.160     9.436     0.500   118.000 -0.05 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 1.00   
Size 
 
    2.394     1.135     0.000     5.645 -0.10 -0.08 0.47 -0.42 -0.12 1.00  
Coverage 
 
    3.143     0.882     0.000     4.710 -0.12 -0.09 0.42 -0.41 0.15 0.77 1.00 
Rel. Ambiguity 
 
    4.250     0.433     3.770     4.895 0.14 0.13 0.05 0.07 -0.13 0.02 -0.14 
Mean Beta 
 
    0.824     0.289    -0.286     2.236 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.10 -0.05 
Variance of Betas 
 
    0.298     0.132     0.000     1.815 -0.05 -0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.22 0.22 
Percent Unique Firms 
 
    0.055     0.102     0.000     1.000 0.05 0.05 -0.07 0.08 -0.05 -0.22 -0.17 
Underwriting (levels) 
 
   32.286    58.148     0.000   423.000 0.08 0.09 0.30 -0.28 -0.02 0.61 0.41 
Status 
 
    0.000     0.874    -0.319     3.718 0.07 0.08 0.32 -0.30 0.04 0.55 0.41 
Status*Underwriting 
(levels) 
   27.489   135.642  -135.133  1442.322 0.15 0.15 0.28 -0.20 0.02 0.41 0.30 
Percent Underwriting 
 
    0.200     0.490     0.007    11.132 0.12 0.11 0.08 -0.03 -0.15 -0.07 -0.16 
Status*Percent 
Underwriting 







TABLE 6.1, continued 
 















         
Lagged Ambiguity 
 
         
Total Categories 
 
         
Experience 
 
         
Workload 
 
         
Size 
 
         
Coverage 
 
         
Rel. Ambiguity 
 
1.00         
Mean Beta 
 
-0.34 1.00        
Variance of Betas  
 
-0.19 0.39 1.00       
Percent Unique Firms 
 
0.06 -0.07 -0.05 1.00      
Underwriting (levels) 
 
0.16 0.11 0.06 -0.12 1.00     
Status 
 
-0.06 0.12 0.07 -0.14 0.54 1.00    
Status*Underwriting (levels) 
 
0.03 0.06 0.02 -0.09 0.63 0.80 1.00   
Percent Underwriting 
 
0.13 0.15 -0.06 0.05 0.19 -0.03 -0.02 1.00  
Status*Percent Underwriting 
 









Results of Ordered Probit, Dependent Variable: Ambiguity 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Lag. Ambiguity 0.503 0.496 0.495 0.491 0.490 
 (0.042)** (0.042)** (0.042)** (0.042)** (0.042)** 
Total Categories 0.238 0.246 0.240 0.245 0.241 
 (0.046)** (0.046)** (0.046)** (0.047)** (0.047)** 
Experience 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Workload -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.003) (0.003)+ (0.003)+ (0.003)* (0.003)* 
Size -0.095 -0.181 -0.189 -0.231 -0.211 
 (0.052)+ (0.065)** (0.057)** (0.068)** (0.070)** 
Coverage -0.092 -0.082 -0.077 -0.073 -0.074 
 (0.070) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
Rel. Ambiguity 0.367 0.304 0.398 0.355 0.354 
 (0.120)** (0.129)* (0.121)** (0.130)** (0.131)** 
Mean beta -0.123 -0.155 -0.195 -0.206 -0.184 
 (0.179) (0.183) (0.182) (0.185) (0.185) 
Variance of betas 0.492 0.524 0.677 0.674 0.658 
 (0.392) (0.390) (0.388)+ (0.388)+ (0.388)+ 
% unique firms 0.032 0.039 0.049 0.051 0.041 
 (0.309) (0.310) (0.311) (0.312) (0.311) 
Underwriting  0.002  0.001 0.001 
  (0.001)**  (0.001) (0.001) 
Status   0.195 0.170 0.074 
   (0.064)** (0.064)** (0.095) 
Interaction     0.001 
     (0.001)+ 
Observations 986 986 986 986 986 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
One tailed tests on all hypothesized variables; two-tailed tests on all other variables 










TABLE 6.2, continued 
 
 
 (6) (7) (8) 
    
Lagged Ambiguity 0.512 0.494 0.487 
 (0.042)** (0.042)** (0.041)** 
Total Categories 0.238 0.240 0.242 
 (0.047)** (0.047)** (0.047)** 
Experience 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Workload -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.003) (0.003)+ (0.003)+ 
Size -0.100 -0.187 -0.191 
 (0.054)+ (0.057)** (0.057)** 
Coverage -0.078 -0.073 -0.076 
 (0.069) (0.070) (0.071) 
Rel. Ambiguity 0.346 0.367 0.343 
 (0.135)* (0.129)** (0.130)** 
Mean Beta -0.122 -0.234 -0.213 
 (0.197) (0.191) (0.191) 
Variance of Betas 0.457 0.714 0.675 
 (0.410) (0.392)+ (0.393)+ 
Percent Unique -0.098 0.046 0.043 
 (0.310) (0.310) (0.311) 
Underwriting Ratio 0.247 0.147 0.609 
 (0.234) (0.142) (0.247)* 
Status  0.195 -0.031 
  (0.064)** (0.106) 
Ratio*Status Interaction   1.579 
   (0.642)* 
Observations 967 986 986 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
One tailed tests on all hypothesized variables; two-tailed tests on all other variables 










Results of Ordinary Least Squares, Dependent Variable:  Ambiguity 
 
 
Lag Ambiguity 0.594 
 (0.037)** 










Rel. Ambiguity 0.466 
 (0.156)** 
Mean Beta -0.210 
 (0.220) 
Variance of Betas 0.808 
 (0.455)+ 
Percent Unique 0.013 
 (0.394) 










Robust standard errors in parentheses  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 








Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
 Mean S.D. Min Max Change in cust 
acct 
Size Cover. Wkload Total 
Categ. 




Change in Cust. Accts    5.612    35.522  -159.400   497.200 1.00         
Size    2.449     1.085     0.000     5.645 0.22 1.00        
 
Coverage 
    
3.234 
    0.817     0.000     4.710 0.12 0.76 1.00       
 
Workload 
   
11.714 
    9.503     0.500   118.000 -0.00 -0.16 0.10 1.00      
 
Total Categories 
    
3.737 
    1.671     1.000    16.000 0.04 0.43 0.38 0.01 1.00     
 
Status 
    
0.028 
    0.870    -0.275     3.768 0.28 0.54 0.40 0.03 0.35 1.00    
 
Quality 
    
0.036 
    1.002    -0.630     3.033 0.22 0.67 0.48 0.03 0.35 0.65 1.00   
 
Change in Quality 
    
0.015 
    0.584    -2.890     2.773 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.28 1.00  
 
Retail Focus 
    
0.551 
    0.498     0.000     1.000 0.03 -0.18 -0.05 0.01 -0.18 -0.16 -0.07 -0.02 1.00 
 
Underwriting 
   
32.286 
   58.148     0.000   423.000 0.25 0.61 0.42 -0.02 0.28 0.54 0.65 0.01 -0.00 
 
Underwriting focus 
    
0.193 
    0.490     0.000    11.125 -0.01 -0.04 -0.11 -0.14 0.13 -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 
 
Merger 
    
0.025 
    0.157     0.000     1.000 0.01 0.17 0.13 -0.02 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.06 -0.06 
 
Ambiguity 
    
3.974 
    1.796     1.000     7.000 0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.01 0.22 0.10 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 
 
Similarity 
    
0.439 
    0.158     0.033     1.000 0.00 -0.20 -0.14 -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 -0.10 0.01 0.05 
 
New scheme 
    
0.582 
    0.493     0.000     1.000 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.00 
 
Change in Similarity 
   -
0.007 
    0.096    -0.557     0.345 0.09 -0.05 -0.03 -0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.12 
 
Strategic Change 
   -
0.005 
    0.087    -0.557     0.345 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.08 
 
Frequency 
    
3.311 
    3.435     0.000    16.000 0.02 -0.29 -0.31 -0.03 -0.41 -0.11 -0.15 -0.01 0.10 
 
Frequency * Quality 
   -
0.410 










          
Underwriting 
 
1.00          
Underwriting 
focus 
0.19 1.00         
Merger 
 
0.18 0.01 1.00        
Ambiguity 
 
0.09 0.11 0.01 1.00       
Similarity 
 
-0.11 -0.02 -0.02 0.11 1.00      
New scheme 
 
-0.09 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.01 1.00     
Change in 
Similarity 
-0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.37 -0.03 1.00    
Strategic 
Change 
0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.09 -0.32 -0.06 0.90 1.00   
Frequency 
 
-0.15 0.02 -0.03 -0.11 0.47 -0.07 -0.08 -0.12 1.00  
Frequency * 
Quality 







Results of Fixed Effects Regression, Dependent Variable:  Change in Customer 
Accounts 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Prior Changes -3.016 -3.024 -2.214 -6.718 -6.830 -3.665 -4.382 -7.285 
 (4.367) (4.372) (4.407) (4.747) (4.639) (4.380) (4.323) (4.588) 
Length Lasted -2.191 -2.037 -1.431 -3.218 -3.579 -2.818 -3.466 -3.492 
 (2.890) (2.916) (2.946) (2.943) (2.877) (2.914) (2.879) (2.869) 
Size -4.497 -4.628 -4.616 -3.446 -3.970 -4.171 -4.170 -5.341 
 (11.773) (11.790) (11.776) (11.736) (11.469) (11.754) (11.587) (11.145) 
Coverage 5.321 5.379 4.664 5.334 5.770 3.623 3.634 5.039 
 (11.809) (11.822) (11.820) (11.747) (11.480) (11.840) (11.671) (11.271) 
Workload -0.116 -0.125 -0.150 -0.065 0.135 -0.060 -0.059 0.192 
 (0.699) (0.700) (0.699) (0.700) (0.686) (0.698) (0.688) (0.666) 
Total Categories -1.329 -1.345 -0.937 -1.162 -0.951 -0.087 -0.622 1.477 
 (2.177) (2.180) (2.197) (2.165) (2.116) (2.319) (2.292) (2.273) 
Status -0.979 -0.953 -1.138 -0.928 1.280 -0.159 0.555 1.341 
 (6.792) (6.800) (6.793) (6.776) (6.642) (6.801) (6.707) (6.490) 
Quality -2.537 -2.541 -2.493 -1.987 -3.028 -2.579 -11.039 -12.064 
 (4.639) (4.644) (4.638) (4.631) (4.532) (4.631) (5.181)* (4.984)* 
Change in Qual. -1.689 -1.783 -1.593 -1.267 -1.523 -1.545 -1.061 -0.761 
 (3.475) (3.486) (3.485) (3.493) (3.414) (3.470) (3.424) (3.324) 
Retail focus 25.447 25.621 26.564 25.336 28.729 24.590 24.278 30.404 
 (10.492)* (10.511)* (10.521)* (10.654)* (10.441)** (10.488)* (10.339)* (10.153)** 
Underwriting 0.127 0.126 0.133 0.113 0.105 0.119 0.100 0.082 
 (0.059)* (0.059)* (0.059)* (0.058)+ (0.057)+ (0.059)* (0.058)+ (0.056) 
Und. Focus -7.749 -7.765 -10.156 -4.906 -2.829 -8.073 -7.641 -6.773 
 (12.215) (12.228) (12.337) (12.166) (11.898) (12.195) (12.022) (11.671) 
Merger 6.286 6.290 6.040 6.981 4.800 6.392 4.182 2.009 
 (12.396) (12.409) (12.396) (12.322) (12.052) (12.374) (12.214) (11.686) 
Ambiguity  0.668 9.138     13.786 
  (1.562) (6.359)     (6.222)* 
Ambiguity^2   -1.150     -1.552 
   (0.837)+     (0.814)* 
Frequency      1.357 1.220 2.419 
      (0.886)+ (0.874) (0.921)** 
Qual*Freq       2.737 2.876 
       (0.793)** (0.775)** 
Similarity        -67.421 
        (31.025)* 
New    -7.572 -8.868   -9.811 
    (4.130)* (4.047)*   (3.989)* 
Change in Sim.    40.754 208.376   178.322 
    (17.227)* (42.392)**   (45.305)** 
Strat. Change     -200.384   -191.578 
     (46.510)**   (45.372)** 
Constant 1.800 -1.002 -15.645 12.781 12.538 1.709 11.056 10.738 
 (33.956) (34.619) (36.183) (35.323) (34.518) (33.895) (33.522) (36.238) 
Observations 522 522 522 520 520 522 522 520 
Number of firms 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.19 
Prob > F 0.33 0.38 0.34 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.03 0.00 
Standard errors in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 


















Sample Classification Schemes & Ratings 
 
Rating System Numerical 
Rating 
Buy, Sell 1 
Buy, Hold, Sell 1 
Outperform, Sector Perform, Underperform 1 
Strong Buy, Buy, Hold, Sell 2 
Buy, Accumulate, Hold, Switch, Sell 3 
Strong Buy, Buy, Speculative Buy, Trading Buy, 
Accumulate, Hold, Watch 
5 
Accumulate, Buy 5 
Top pick/average risk, top pick/above average risk, top 
pick/speculate, outperform/average risk, outperform/above 
average risk, outperform/speculate, sector perform/average 
risk, sector perform/above average risk, sector 
perform/speculate, underperform/average risk, 
underperform/above average, underperform/speculate 
7 
Strong buy, buy, speculative buy, trading buy, accumulate, 






Calculation of the Average Pairwise Jaccard Score 
 
The Jaccard score measures the intersection over union of two sets of objects (Hsu, 
2006a; Ruef, 1997).  It is useful when the absence of overlapping objects between two 
sets does not necessarily make a set similar to another.  To calculate the Jaccard score, 
each scheme was compared to the other schemes present in the same year.  The scores 
were put in a scheme by scheme matrix, and then averaged across rows to get the average 
pairwise Jaccard score.  This was repeated with each year in the data.  I also created 
Jaccard scores looking at firms of the same kind (retail or institutional focused, hybrid 
focused) as well as all firms for which I had scheme data in a given year.  The different 
measures were highly correlate (.93, .95, and .98).  A smaller, stylized example of the 
coding is detailed below. 
For a single Jaccard coefficient: 
Scheme 1:  Buy, Hold, Sell 
Scheme 2:  Strong Buy, Buy, Hold, Sell 
Jaccard coefficient = (Buy, Hold, Sell)/(Strong Buy, Buy, Hold, Sell) = ¾ = .75 













Buy, Hold, Sell  ¾ (.75) 0/3 (0) 2/5 (.4) .3833 
Strong Buy, Buy, 
Hold, Sell 




0/3 (0) 0/4 (0)  1/7 (.1428) .0476 
Marketperform, 
Strong Buy, Buy, 
Neutral, Sell 








X-17A-5 forms (SEC, Thomson One Banker) 
SDC Platinum 
NASD web site 
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